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DETECTING AND TRACING SLOW ATTACKS ON MOBILE PHONE
USER SERVICE
Brian Cusack, Zhuang Tian
Digital Forensic Research Laboratories, AUT
brian.cusack@aut.ac.nz, zhuang_tian@hotmail.com

Abstract
The lower bandwidth of mobile devices has until recently filtered the range of attacks on the Internet. However,
recent research shows that DOS and DDOS attacks, worms and viruses, and a whole range of social engineering
attacks are impacting on broadband smartphone users. In our research we have developed a metric-based system to
detect the traditional slow attacks that can be effective using limited resources, and then employed combinations of
Internet trace back techniques to identify sources of attacks. Our research question asked: What defence
mechanisms are effective? We critically evaluate the available literature to appraise the current state of the
problem area and then propose an innovative solution for the detection and investigation of attacks.
Keywords: Slow Attacks, Detection, Trace back, Mobile, Communications

INTRODUCTION
There have been known security incidents of DDoS involving Mobile devices. For instance, September 2015,
researchers from CloudFlare reported that a DDoS attack peaked at over 275,000 HTTP requests per second and
resulted in 4.5 billion hits on the targeted website. This was blamed on a malicious advertising that compromised up
to 650,000 Smartphones (Murdock, 2015, p.1). An update (2016) notes that these attacks spike during the weekend,
they are very large in size, and that these attacks are no longer targeted only at high profile websites but also at
mobile services. 3G technologies use IP technologies for control and transport; and, require cross network service
collaborations, multi-vendor, and a multi-domain environment in order to gratify a wide variety of needs. This
relationship requires Internet-based data and data from the cellular network in order to provide services to wireless
users (Kotapati, et al., 2005, p.631). Bailey et al. (2009) reported that smart devices were responsible for generating
14 times more traffic than a non-smart device. As a result, the cellular networks have made tremendous
improvements in order to meet the demands for increased bandwidth and communication requirements (Anstee et
al., 2013). According to Farina et al. (2014), the 4G connections are responsible for generating six times more
traffic than non 4G connections. However, globally, mobile data traffic reached 3.7 Exabyte per month in 2015;
making mobile data traffic grow 4,000-fold over the past 10 years and almost 400-million-fold over the past 15
years. Smart devices represented 36 percent of mobile device connections globally in 2015. This accounted for 89
percent of mobile data traffic in which 55 percent was mobile video traffic. Consequently our paper acknowledges
the trends but addresses the traditional slow attack that works with all mobile devices of any bandwidth (Farina et
al., 2016).
The new venture between the two different technologies introduces new vulnerabilities and exposes the users on the
cellular network to a range of additional risks across the new surface (Ricciato, et al., 2010, p.553).The introduction
and growth of usages of technologies such as 4G/LTE and its high bandwidth has increased the pervasive nature of
access points to the network. It is therefore evident mobile devices constitute not only a new target of an attack but
also it has the capability to execute an attack (Farina, et al., 2016, p.269). Contact lists stored on mobile devices can
be used to spread malware and infect other devices (Plohmann, et al., 2011, p.133). A DoS/DDoS attack has
evolved from flooding strategies to low bandwidth tactics that employ slow techniques and can operate in all
bandwidths. The purpose of this Slow DoS techniques is to lower the amount of bandwidth and resources that are
required to execute an attack. The slow techniques have been adopted and used against devices such as mobile
phones and game stations (Cambiaso, et al., 2012, p.195). While most of the packets sent to the target node in a
flooding DoS attack may be useless but, in a low-rate attack, almost all of the packets play a role in the success of
the attack. Therefore, the low-rate DoS will force the victim to process only the attack packets. There is not yet an
effective tool to address an efficient detection method in relation to slow-rate DoS (p.197).
In this paper, we present an innovative technique to detect this kind of attack on mobile devices and also the use of
multiple digital forensics methods to trace back the attack to its origin through the internet. The paper is designed to
define slow attacks and to demonstrate our detection metric. We then present a flow diagram for investigation of
slow attacks. The discussion on trace back reviews some of the previous and current literature in the field and draws
the conclusion that two techniques working together are better than one on its own. We conclude by discussing
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these claims and suggesting that slow attacks can be detected and managed to prevent loss of service to mobile
phone users.

LOW RESOURCE ATTACKS
Low resource attacks rely on drip feeding malicious packets into a system. These techniques are often described as
being slow because they are in contrast to flooding which rushes multiple packets through high bandwidth
connections (Gilad and Herzberg, 2012). In contrast a low resource attack slowly drips malicious packets into a
system such as a mobile phone where the victim processes every packet. Figure 1 shows the protocols which are
open for exploitation by low resource slow attacks. The key element in each protocol is the ability for the attacker to
slow down the attack packet by packet and to exploit the protocol mechanisms. Slow HTTP attacks, for example,
rely on the fact that the HTTP protocol, by design, requires requests to be completely received by the server before
they are processed. If an http request is not complete, or if the transfer rate is very low, the server keeps its resources
busy waiting for the rest of the data. If the server keeps too many resources busy, this creates a denial of service.
Table 1. Protocols for slow attack.
Protocols
Attributes

HTTP, HTTPS, ICMP, TCP, UDP,
SYN, IRC
Time interval

These types of attack are easy to execute because a single machine is able to establish thousands of connections to a
server and generate thousands of unfinished HTTP requests in a very short period of time using minimal bandwidth.
Due to implementation differences among various HTTP servers, two main attack vectors exist (Cambiaso, et al.,
2012):
 Slowloris: Slowing down HTTP headers, making the server wait for the final CRLF, which indicates the
end of the headers section; and,
 Slow POST: Slowing down the HTTP message body, making the server wait until all content arrives
according to the Content-Length header; or until the final CRLF arrives, where if HTTP 1.1 is being used
and no Content-Length was declared.
These attacks can just look like requests that are taking a long time, so it’s hard to detect and prevent them by using
traditional anti-DoS tools. In low resource conditions these attacks are effective because it does not require a large
number of packets to create the effect. A defence against such an attack can be made by the following actions:
 Reject / drop connections with HTTP methods not supported by the URL.
 Limit the header and message body to a minimal reasonable length. Set tighter URL-specific limits as
appropriate for every resource that accepts a message body.
 Set an absolute connection timeout nearing in mind that if the timeout is too short, you risk dropping
legitimate slow connections; and if it’s too long, you don’t get any protection from attacks. A timeout
value slightly greater than median lifetime of connections should satisfy most of the legitimate clients.
 The backlog of pending connections allows the server to hold connections it’s not ready to accept, and this
allows it to withstand a larger slow HTTP attack, as well as gives legitimate users a chance to be served
under high load. However, a large backlog also prolongs the attack, since it backlogs all connection
requests regardless of whether they’re legitimate. If the server supports a backlog, make it reasonably large
so your HTTP server can handle a small attack.
 Define the minimum incoming data rate, and drop connections that are slower than that rate. Care must be
taken not to set the minimum too low, or you risk dropping legitimate connections.
However, these actions provide some protection but they do not signal a slow attack is taking place – which we
address by innovation in the next section.

DETECTING ATTACKS
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is simple but a very powerful technique of attack that disrupts service (Hadiks
et al., 2014). The recent rapid proliferation and development of mobile technologies has also led to the exploitation
for service disruption (Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004, p.292). New techniques have also been developed to exploit
the capacities and the characteristics of the service. This is where the DoS attack known as Low-rate DoS/DDoS
attacks has evolved (Wang et al., 2007). Low-rate DDoS sends attack traffic periodically to the target device which
makes it hard to detect amongst the normal traffic (Cambiaso et al., 2012). Various techniques for detection of the
traditional flooding DDoS has been discussed in the literature. This section is designed to define and propose the
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use of the distance based similarity metric to detect a Low-rate DDoS attack. The metric has been used in other
contexts by Riccardio et al. (2010) who proposed a Similarity of Attack Intentions (SAI) to estimate the similarity
of cybercrime intentions for network forensics. Another study found that using self-similarity algorithm to detect
flooding DDoS attacks (Yu, 2014b). It has been used as the method for link predictions that compare one data set
with another. For instance, x and y is assigned a score Sxy which can be defined as proximity or similarity between x
and y (Yu, 2014a). The Similarity metric can be used in a more skilled approach such as using node attributes to
define their similarity (Yu, 2014c). Similarity has been used also to evaluate distances between nodes. The shorter
the path between nodes, the more similar they are (Snoeren et al., 2012). Distance based similarity metric is
employed in this study to evaluate the similarity of the previous log file against the current log file in order to
determine if a DDoS attack has occurred. Hadicks et al. (2014) argued that defining the problem will be the best
way to fully understand the nature of the problem and what to match, i.e., what are the features to be used in
matching; what are the constraints we have to consider; how to match, i.e., the matching process for achieving a
consistent match; how to evaluate the match, i.e., define the similarity measure (p.3). The challenge in slow or lowrate DoS/DDoS attack is to map the proximity between attacking packets for identification, and then to initiate trace
back methods based on the identified packets.
To evaluate the similarity between two different objects x and y, a distance metric known as Euclidean Distance
(EU) is used. This metric can also be generalized into n-dimensions points, such that a={x1, x2, … xn} and b={y1, y2,
…, yn}. In this case, n-dimensions EU metric is defined as:
=
To apply this metric to a Web server or to a mobile device then the log files have to be isolated for analysis. Let L1
and L2 be the existing log file and the current log file, respectively. Let xi represent each protocol used in the
existing log and yi represent the protocol used in the current log, where i={1, 2, …, n} and n is the total number of
protocols where, L1 ={x1, x2, …, xn} and L2 ={y1, y2, …, yn}. For computational purposes the Euclidean distance can
be normalized into a distance based similarity as follow:
The normalized EU delivers a value in between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 means that the two objects are identical
and a value other than 1 means that the two objects are not identical. Consequently the analysis focuses upon the
discrimination between two known log files. The differential will indicate changes that can inform the alert of an
attack. For the DDoS attack various protocols can be engaged in an attack (see figure 1). In order to detect an attack,
the similarity between the existing and the current log files are ranked. In doing so, the Euclidean distance between
L1 and L2 is calculated by using the first equation and then the similarity can be ranked based on the second
equation. Table 1 provides a worked example of the detection metrics being applied to a sample set of mobile attack
data that was downloaded from the Internet to illustrate the use of the detection system. It is a simple case of
calculating the distance based similarity of various protocols that were used in the attack. The sample data was
taken from a live attack and then processed. Once the attack has been detected, the protocol that was engaged in the

Table 2. A simple case of distance based similarity ranking.
Protocols
L1
L2
EU(L1, L2)
S

HTTP
x1=1000
y1=21000
20000
0.00005

HTTPS
x2=800
y2=1000
200
0.004

ICMP
x3=600
y3=600
0
1

TCP
x4=2000
y4=3000
1000
0.001

UDP
x5=5000
y5=7000
2000
0.0005

SYN
x6=6000
y6=1000
5000
0.0002

IRC
x7=200
y7=500
300
0.03

attack needs to be identified. This data in Table 2 shows in the S row that only one ICMP sample was the same. The
variations in the other protocols indicates that an attack is occurring through them.

INVESTIGATING SLOW ATTACKS
Mobile forensics is defined as the science of recovering digital evidences from a mobile device under forensically
sound conditions using accepted methods (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). Mobile forensics investigation process
consist of 15 phases that are divided into three main processes. The initialization process, the acquisition processes
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and the investigative processes. (Omeleze and Venter, 2013, p.5). The investigative processes consists of six
processes. The Potential digital evidence acquisition, digital evidence examination and analysis, digital evidence
interpretation, reporting, presentation and investigation closure (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). The processes
employed in this study only concern the examination and analysis phase. The results will be used to determine a
slow attack first and then initiate trace back the potential location of the attacker (Curran, et al., 2010; Omeleze et
al., 2013). These processes were designed not only to eliminate the irrelevant data but assure the admissibility of the
evidence in the court of law (Jansen, et al., 2007). The mobile forensics analysis process as illustrated in figure 1
starts with the data acquired from the victim’s device. The data is used together with the reports from the similarity
distance detection metric they can be calculated as a continuous live process or from previous log data.
Report from
similarity detection
START

Image from mobile
device

Identify similarity
results from the
image data

Similarity in
the data

NO

YES

Storage

Analyse packet
headers according to
similarity results

NO
Extract source IP
addreses

Found
evidence?

Further analysis &
start reconstructing
the attack path
YES
END

Prepare report

Figure 1. Mobile Low-rate DDoS forensics investigation process
Figure 1 assumes the common forensic soundness criteria are applied to correlate practice management by
answering the questions: What meaning can be extracted from the evidence? What are the potential error factors?
What are the training requirements for forensic practitioners? The model was developed to systematise processes
while we investigated a number of slow attacks.

TRACEBACK
Traditional trace back methods are well-established for the Internet and broadband devices. The evidence presented
in the introduction to this paper suggests that the majority of mobile phones are not broadband but the broadband
phones produced most of the traffic. In addition all phones have some form of connectivity to the Internet.
Therefore it is our argument that we can evaluate the traditional trace back methods and select the ones that are most
appropriate for tracing back slow attacks. One reason that spoofing is often facilitated in these and other DoS or
DDoS attacks is that it allows evasion of filters and quotas based on sender IP address, making tracing attackers
harder (Devasundaram et al., 2006). Yu (2014b) reinforces that tracking back to the attack origin in DDoS attacks is
a difficult and non-trivial problem due to the following reasons. Firstly, it is easy to forge or modify IP address (e.g.
IP spoofing). Secondly, the stateless nature of IP routing, where routers normally know only the next hop for
forwarding a packet instead of the entire end to end path taken by each packet, makes IP traceback even harder.
Moreover, the Internet was originally designed for fast file sharing in a trusted environment and the network
security was less important than communications, as it was a secondary consideration. Routers do not verify the
source address of IP packets and the entire routing table is constructed on a trust basis. However, there are
methodologies they can trace back to the last router from single packets. These methods can also be applied to trace
back slow attacks, packet by packet (Goodrich, 2008).
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A number of trace back methodologies can be rejected because they are impractical or too costly to implement.
With slow attacks we are dealing with single packets or periodic clustered dispersions which are drip fed into a
system to compromise devices. The metric can detect these time based malicious packets and once an alert sounded,
trace back methods can be employed. A slow Denial of Service (DoS) attack can be characterized as an attack with
the purpose of preventing legitimate users from using some specific network utilities such as a website, web service
or computer system (Hadiks et al., 2014). It is also a coordinated attack on the availability of the service of a given
target system or network. It can be launched indirectly through many compromised computing systems. The
websites or other mobile devices used to launch the attack are often called the ‘secondary victims’ (Izaddoost et al.,
2007). The use of secondary victims in a slow DDoS attack provides an attacker with the ability to launch a much
larger and more disruptive attack than a slow DoS attack while remaining anonymous since the secondary victims
actually complete the attack, and hence make it more difficult for the digital forensic investigator (DFI) to track
down the original attacker. In general, there are two types of standard attacks (Leavitt, 2005): direct and reflector
attacks. In a direct attack, an attacker sends attack packets directly towards the victims. Attack packets can be any of
the protocols in figure 1. (Kumar et al., 2011). In each attack on a mobile device a variety of networks are being
used. The first instance it may be a Wi-Fi connection, or a direct cellular signal, or any other wireless protocol.
Although it may be theoretically possible to trace back in IP address and practice there are too many mediating
factors, including spoofing, dynamic IP, and other obfuscations. However at the packet level the packets carry
information regarding the pathway they have taken. For example the ICMP protocol can hold information regarding
at least the last two or three services it transacted through routers. Hence, in particular for mobile devices connected
to a wireless router trace back progress can be made.
Table 3. Comparison of Traceback Methods
Traceback Method

Hop Count
Filtering

ICMP

Logging

Marking

Marking
&
Logging

TTL &
Marking

FDDA

ISP Involvement

None

Low

Moderate

Low

None

None

None

No. of Attack
Packets needed for
traceback

1

Very
Large

1

Very
Large

1

Very
Large

large

Processing Overhead

Very Low

Low

Low

Low

Very
Low

Low

High

Storage

Very Low

Low

Low

High

High

High

High

Ease of
Implementation

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Scalability

Highest

High

Fair

High

High

Highest

Highest

Bandwidth Overhead

None

Low

None

None

None

High

High

No. of functions
needed to implement

3

2

3

2

5

5

6

Ability to handle
major DDOS attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

Poor

Yes

Yes

Yes

Classification

IDS Based

Proactive

IDS Based

Proactive

IDS
Based

Proactive

IDS
Based

OSI Model Layer
and Protocols

IP, Network
Layer

ICMP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer
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The intermediate routers (routers between the source and destination) will generate a special ICMP packet
according to the probability of 1 out of 20,000 once it receives an IP packet. The ICMP packet will be sent to either
the source or the destination host with equal probability. The router’s path information is stored in the ICMP packet
and is collected and analyzed at the destination host. With forward or back link information, two routers can be
identified in the path; while with two links of information, three routers can be identified. Because only partial path
information is contained in the ICMP packet, it will be extremely difficult to identify several attack paths under a
flooding DDoS attack but for slow attacks the method is much more effective (Kumar et al., 2010). To consistently
construct the full or partial path, the destination host has to match the original IP packet with its corresponding
ICMP packet, and this can be difficult. However, if the ICMP method is used in conjunction with the hop count
method then some of the obstacles to tracing back to the source of the malicious packets can be overcome. The
basic idea of hop count filtering method is to identify spoofed IP packets by using the source OS address and the
hop count value in the IP packet and the filter of the spoofed IP packet under DoS and DDoS attack. The rational is
that most of spoofed IP packets do not carry hop count values that are consistent with the IP address being spoofed
at victim’s device. Hence, an IP-to-hop-count (IP2HC) mapping table is built by the use of our metric during
operations to distinguish between malicious and normal traffic. The simulation results show that close to 90% of
spoofed traffic was identified (Paxson, 2001; Plohmann et al., 2011). Once an accurate IP2HC mapping table is
built, the inspection algorithm checks the source IP address and the final time-to-live (TTL) value in each packet.
The hop count method is not precisely an IP traceback method, since it cannot accurately pin point the attacking
origin. It can only give a list of possible routers associating with an attacking origin. If all of the routers on the list
form a circle, then the victim is the center and the hop count distance is the radius. Coupled with the ICMP analysis
these are the most effective ways to trace back a slow DoS/DDoS attack (Smoeren et al., 2004).

CONCLUSION
Detecting and tracing slow attacks on mobile phone user services is possible when combinations of methodologies
are employed. We have demonstrated using dummy attack data from the web (Table 2) that our metric will detect
and alert a slow denial of service attack from any of the protocols in Table 1. The review of trace back
methodologies shows that many are not useful for slow attack but a combination of ICMP and the hop count
methodologies can be effective by simply focusing on the packets. Disruption and other attacks will continue to
grow on mobile devices of any bandwidth. Consequently, further research is required into detection, protection, and
trace back methodologies in order to secure services.
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Abstract
Forensic investigations of digital devices is generally conducted on a seized device in a secure environment.
This usually necessitates powering down the device and taking an image of the hard drive or semi-permanent
storage in the case of solid state technology. Guidelines for forensic investigations of computers advise that the
computer should be shut down by removing the power supply and thereby maintaining the hard disk in the state
it was in whilst running. However, valuable forensic evidence often exists in the volatile memory which is lost
when this process is followed. The issues of locked accounts on running computers and encrypted files present
particular difficulties for forensic investigators who wish to capture a forensic image of the RAM. This research
involves freezing RAM removed from a running computer so that it can later be reinserted into an unlocked
computer allowing for a forensic image of the RAM to be captured. Three different methods of cooling the RAM
are compared, along with varying delays in RAM reinsertion. The results provide a guideline for forensic
investigators on how the issues with locked accounts and encryption may be overcome to record this valuable
evidence that is otherwise lost.
Keywords
information security, RAM, forensics

INTRODUCTION
The forensic investigation of digital devices usually involves an investigator examining a cell phone, tablet of
computer hard disk in a sterile environment. Guidelines for forensic investigators often advise that if a computer
is running, it should be switched off at the power source to preserve the hard drive in its current state (National
Institute of Justice 2008). One authoritative guide for forensic investigations suggested the need to preserve all
evidence yet then suggested that power should be removed immediately from a running computer. This was
corrected in a later version where a greater recognition of the value of evidence in the memory was recognised.
(Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 2012). Shutting down the computer using the normal method will
inevitably cause data to be written to the hard drive possibly overwriting valuable forensic evidence from
deleted files (Vidas 2007). Whilst this method focusses on the potential forensic evidence on a hard drive, the
Random Access Memory (RAM) is often overlooked as a source of forensic evidence. RAM may contain highly
valuable forensic data such as web browsing history, programs that have been recently run or werecurrently
running and usernames and passwords in unencrypted form (Halderman, Schoen et al. 2009). This highly
valuable and useful information will be lost the instant power is switched off to the computer (Simon and Slay
2009).
It is fairly trivial to insert a USB drive with the required software to download the contents of RAM on to an
external drive for later analysis. Whilst often this is not done, the fact that RAM may contain several gigabytes
of valuable forensic evidence means that evidence is lost because the forensic investigator has not considered
this area to be valuable to an investigation. One problem that may arise for an investigator is that of a computer
that has been locked by the user and requires a password to unlock the user account. Whilst this may not present
a problem in recovering hard drive evidence, the shutting down of the computer will permanently delete the
volatile evidence in memory. Another significant issue that has surfaced in recent years for forensic
investigators is the increasing use of cryptographic tools to encrypt files or entire hard drives. The cryptography
is generally robust enough to withstand all attempts at finding the encryption key required to unlock this
evidence. A securely encrypted drive means that evidence can be seized but that it simply cannot be read
rendering it useless.
This research examines the area of RAM forensics as an important source of digital forensic evidence for
investigators. Methods of freezing RAM are utilised to compare the retention of data within the RAM utilising
three different methods. Results are then compared so that guidelines for forensic investigators are presented
allowing recovery of RAM contents using these methods.
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STATE OF THE ART
The physical address space consists of all valid physical memory addresses that are readable by the CPU (Intel
Corporation 2013). The Memory Management Unit (MMU) acts as an intermediary between the operating
system and the memory so that any attempt at acquiring the contents of RAM will require the utilised software
to overcome restrictions created by the MMU. Whilst the utilisation of address spaces may vary across
architectures and operating systems, the address spaces in RAM are all potentially accessible through
specialised software.
The layout of the physical address space in RAM is finalised upon completion of the copying of firmware code
from ROM to RAM (Salihun 2012). Once this is complete, the RAM is ready for use by the operating system.
Some forensic guidelines suggest photographing a computer screen and then switching the computer off at the
power supply but forensic investigators are often aware of the valuable evidence contained in RAM and suggest
performing a memory dump prior to powering off the system (Ligh, Case et al. 2014). Whilst a memory dump
of RAM should provide all contents of RAM, it is possible that memory smear may occur because of the time
taken to acquire the RAM contents (Vömel and Freiling 2012). Memory smear occurs when memory is copied
from RAM to a physical media and during this process some errors occur because of the time taken for the
acquisition. This results in minor differences between the RAM contents and the RAM image so that whilst a
100% match of the contents is hoped for, often the image falls slightly below a 100% match.
To overcome this problem, a hardware-based approach using a Firewire connection can be utilised which
provides more direct access to RAM, decreasing the error rate to the point that often a 100% match can be
achieved (Huebner, Bem et al. 2007). If the Firewire approach is not feasible and the computer is running a
Windows operating system, then 2 other methods may provide greater reliability than a memory dump (Ruff
2008). Firstly, intentionally crashing the operating system will cause the RAM contents to be copied to the hard
disk meaning a forensic acquisition of the hard disk should include most, if not all of the contents of RAM. The
drawback to this method on a Windows Operating System is that the same computer must be rebooted to allow
memory to be rewritten to the RAM (Russinovich, Solomon et al. 2012). The second method is to utilise the
hibernation feature which will copy the contents of RAM to the hard disk and then power down the computer.
Whilst Firewire may provide greater reliability in copying memory to external storage, and the other methods
suggested may provide sufficient integrity of the data for Windows Operating Systems, the forensic investigator
may be in a position where these options are not available. Additionally, these options won’t work if the
computer has been locked by the user so that access to the RAM is not available. This problem is common and
whilst asking for the password may be an option, a legally savvy suspect will likely refuse to give the password.
Furthermore, full disk encryption is becoming more commonplace with freely available software such as
TrueCrypt that will encrypt all files on a disk rendering them unreadable unless the password is disclosed that
will decrypt the files. One issue that may also present to investigators during the memory acquisition phase is a
deliberate attempt to corrupt the contents of memory if a memory dump is attempted. Specialised software
designed to corrupt the memory can be created and will run when the memory is dumped from the operating
system (Milkovic 2012). This can be overcome if the anti-forensic can be disabled or the RAM can be removed
and inserted into another, similar but clean computer.
In 2016, an experiment was run in freezing RAM using freezing spray (Bauer, Gruhn & Freiling, 2016). In this
experiment the RAM was cooled insitu with the computer running. The focus on the experiments was to
demonstrate the recovery of the data and how it could be unscrambled to produce an original image or file.
Unlike the current experiments, it did not utilise cooling with liquid nitrogen or ice and so has a different focus
than this research.
The following section describes the experiments in cooling RAM so that the forensic investigator can remove
the ram yet maintain the integrity of the data for a sufficient period of time to permit forensic analysis of the
contents.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The problem for forensic investigators of locked user accounts means that RAM cannot be examined because an
unlocked computer is required to examine and download RAM. The computer is locked by the user selecting
‘ctrl alt delete’ which then requires that same user’s password to be entered to unlock the computer. What is
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therefore required from a forensic investigator is the ability to remove RAM from a locked computer without
losing the integrity of the digital contents and to either place the RAM into an identical computer or to reboot
the suspect computer into a state where it is not locked. The RAM can then be inserted into the unlocked
computer and a memory dump performed. The first stage in the experiments was to boot a laptop computer to
the Windows 7 operating system. This system was chosen as it remains one of the most common operating
systems in organisations and for home users. Six actions were then performed to provide data in the 1 GB RAM
that would be useful in an investigation.
Those actions were:
1. Log on to Windows 7 with the administrator username and password.
2. Open a text file and copied text to the clipboard.
3. Started an Apache HTTP web server and MySQL database.
4. Unlocked a TrueCrypt file container and opened several files from the container.
5. Executed several commands using a DOS prompt.
6. Launched a web browser and logged into a Facebook account.

The process for calculating the percentage of data recovered was to take an image of the RAM and then to lock
the account on the computer. The power button was then held down to halt power to the motherboard and the
RAM removed at the same time where it was immediately put through the cooling process. Once the full
experiment was completed and a RAM image obtained, this image was then compared to the prior image and
the percentage of data recovered calculated.
Whilst this gives an accurate percentage of the data recovered, it does so at a macro level so that if parts of files
are recovered or even parts of passwords, this is not obvious from the percentages that are recovered. To
ascertain at a micro level, a more manual examination is required and in the case of recovered passwords this
was done to ensure that a full password or encryption key has been recovered. The parameters for the test bed
are shown in table 1:
Table 1: Testbed Setup
Item
Description
RAM

1GB DDR3

Error
Correction?

Non Error Correction RAM

CPU

Samsung 2.4GHz

The experiments with freezing RAM to recover its contents began with a baseline to compare the results against.
The baseline simply involved removing RAM from a computer and inserting the RAM into the now unlocked
and rebooted computer. The minimum time between removal of the RAM and insertion into the computer was
10 minutes, allowing ample time for the investigator to reboot the machine to a usable state.
The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at 35 degrees centigrade. As expected, the contents of RAM
were deleted upon removal so that no usable forensic evidence could be recovered using this method.
Table 2 shows the experimental setup for the RAM utilising three different cooling methods. The ambient
temperature of the RAM before cooling was 35° degrees centigrade.
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Table 2: RAM Freezing Experimental Steps
Temperature
Time
Method
Cooled
Delay
degrees C
Liquid
Nitrogen

10mins, 1
hr, 2hrs

-196

Freezing
Spray

10 mins

-40

ICE

10 mins

10

The next step was to utilise liquid nitrogen to freeze the RAM. This has been attempted by previous researchers
with good results. The RAM was removed from the running but locked computer and immediately submerged in
liquid nitrogen, almost instantly freezing the RAM and it was hoped that the contents would therefore remain.
The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at -196 degrees centigrade. The experiment was repeated a
number of times with varying longer delays in removing the RAM from the liquid nitrogen to see of entropy of
the contents occurred. The experiment was then repeated but with a spray of freezing compressed air rather than
liquid nitrogen. The freezing by compressed air was a simple process and could easily be performed by a
forensic investigator in the field as opposed to the practicality of carrying liquid nitrogen to an investigation
scene. The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at -40 degrees centigrade. Finally, the third stage
involved removing the RAM, placing it in an anti-static bag and burying it in ice cubes for 10 minutes. The
surface temperature was measured at 10 degrees centigrade just immediately after removing it from the ice.
Once cooled, the RAM was then reinserted into the same computer and the computer booted from a USB stick
with DumpIT, a Linux memory dumping software programme installed on the stick which creates an image of
the RAM. In the initial boot stages, the software immediately dumped the contents of the RAM onto a storage
area on the USB stick where it remained for later analysis. The results of the RAM cooling are described below.

RESULTS
The purpose of the experiments was to ascertain whether freezing RAM with compressed air or ice would
provide forensic evidence from the RAM that could be utilised in an investigation. It was ascertained that
removing RAM and reinserting it 10 minutes later led to almost all contents being deleted. The liquid nitrogen
provided results that led to almost a complete recovery of the RAM but was not practical for a forensic
investigation in the field. Therefore, the freezing spray and submergence in ice were of particular interest as
these methods are both feasible for an investigator. A can of freezing spray is easily obtainable for negligible
cost and ice may be available if a forensic investigator has no freezing spray readably available. The following
table shows the results in percentage of data recovered from RAM after 10 minutes.
Table 3: Percentage of forensic data recovered
Temperature
Percentage
Method
degrees
Recovered
Celsius
No cooling
35
0.2%
Liquid Nitrogen
-196
99.81%
Freezing Spray
-40
96.45%
Ice
10
99.71%
The results indicated that whilst liquid nitrogen performed the best, submerging the RAM in ice was a very
close second best with only 0.1% less data recovered. Freezing spray, whilst the most practical for a forensic
investigator to carry in their toolkit, results in 96.45% data recovered. Whilst this result is significant, the 3.3%
data not recovered compared to ice may be vital evidence that would be lost when choosing this method. Next,
the results for submerging the RAM in liquid nitrogen were extended from previous experiments by allowing
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for a much greater delay in submerging the RAM and removing it from the liquid nitrogen. The purpose of these
further experiments were to simulate a forensic investigator who is equipped with a container of liquid nitrogen
who may be able to simple drop the RAM into the container but may require a sterile and safe environment
equipped with protective clothing to remove the RAM from the nitrogen. The time delay was therefore
extended from 10 minutes to 1 hour and then repeated for a delay of 2.5 hours. The results are shown in table 4.
Table 4: Time delay with liquid nitrogen
Percentage
Time delay
Difference
Recovered
10 minutes

99.81%

1 hour

98.84%

-0.97%

2.5 hours

93.95%

-4.89%

It is clear from table 4 that even at -196% Celsius data is lost from RAM if there is a delay in reinserting the
RAM into an unlocked computer. A delay of 1 hour results in a loss of over 1% more data than by utilising a
freezing spray. If a delay of 2.5 hours occurs, then the loss exceeds the freezing spray by 2.5%. A delay of 1
hour may be unrealistic in many scenarios where the submergence of RAM would be followed by seizing of the
computer and related activities, meaning that returning to a safely equipped laboratory may well take longer
than 60 minutes. The delay of 2.5 hours is more realistic and shows a significant loss of valuable data. The
rather low loss of 0.29% of data with ice indicates that this is the preferred method. It shows that loss of data is
minimal and it is a very safe method, although somewhat cumbersome for the forensic investigator in the field.
The preferred method may be to carry a can of compressed air as this is simple and fairly safe, but the forensic
investigator must bear in mind that approximately 3.55% of data will be lost with a delay of only 10 minutes.
Finally, the data that was recovered from the RAM was identified. A USB drive with Linux software suitable
for a RAM dump was used to store the RAM image. Among the data recovered was the expected information
regarding user activities on the computer including web pages visited and processes that were started and
stopped. Of particular interest was whether the TrueCrypt password could be recovered. It was found in all
experiments that the 512 bit AES encryption key utilised by TrueCrypt was recovered allowing the encrypted
files to be decrypted and read. This is particularly important for the forensic investigator because it is often the
encrypted files that contain the most vital information for the forensic investigator. The recovery of the
encryption key was possible in all experiments involving cooling of the RAM but with less than 100% of data
recovered there was some luck involved. Any data that is lost may by bad luck involve the encryption key or
other vital evidence and so the forensic investigator should bear this in mind when selecting which method to
utilise. The greater the percentage of data recovered, the greater the likelihood that the most vital data will
remain in the RAM image.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of a forensic investigation of a computer is to acquire, analyse and potentially use information in a
criminal, civil or employee investigation. The more information that can be gleaned from the device, the higher
the likelihood of a successful investigation. Traditional methods of preserving information from a running
computer usually involve looking at the screen to ascertain running programs and then removing the power to
the device to preserve the information on the hard disk. Often, the valuable forensic information in RAM is
overlooked, or thought to be unobtainable because of a locked user account or encrypted files that prevent the
investigator from reading the files unless the encryption key can be obtained. This is unlikely if the suspect’s
computer contains malicious or nefarious evidence of wrongdoing. The ability to secure the RAM image is
therefore highly valuable to the forensic investigator.
This research provides evidence that RAM images can be obtained in these circumstances, and in the case of
TrueCrypt encryption, the encryption key may be able to be recovered from the image of memory. This research
provides a guideline for forensic investigators as to the best methods for a successful data recovery of RAM and
provides evidence of the importance of time delays in the entropy of information in the case of liquid nitrogen
freezing. The importance of memory forensics should not be overlooked by the forensic investigator and the
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implementation of account locking or encryption of files or entire volumes does not present an insurmountable
challenge to successfully acquiring a RAM image.
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Abstract

The use of computer forensics is important for forensic accounting practice because most accounting
information is in digital forms today. The access to evidence is increasingly more complex and in far greater
volumes than in previous decades. The effective and efficient means of detecting fraud are required for the
public to maintain their confidence in the reliability of accounting audit and the reputation of accounting firms.
The software tools used by forensic accounting can be called into question. Many appear inadequate when faced
with the complexity of fraud and there needs to be the development of automated and specialist problem-solving
forensic software. In this paper we review the context of forensic accounting and the potential to develop
improved support tools. The recommendation is for adopting financial ratio analysis as the basis for an
improved fraud detection software.
Keywords
Financial Ratio Analysis, Forensic accounting, Forensic Software Tools, Fraud

INTRODUCTION
Before a potential fraud can be investigated, it must be detected. The process of fraud detection involves
searching for symptoms that may indicate that fraud exists (Kovalerchuk et al., 2007, p.2). One of the most
popular mathematical techniques which are currently used in forensic accounting, is that Benford law. The main
issue with this technique is that it takes a relatively broad, rather than narrow approach to detecting fraud. As a
result a lot of false signals can occur with the impact of time consumption and increase costs in investigations.
Another technique known as relative size factor (RSF), is designed to detect any outliers or unusual data.
However, any outlier can be just errors in data entry but not financial fraud. Panighahi (2006, p.3) stated that
“RSF is simple to calculate but not an effective and efficient tool”. An abundance of data creates both challenges
and opportunities for the forensic accountant. A digital forensics software tool is employed to help deal with the
big data problem and to speed up both the accuracy and the completion of investigations. The problem with
computer based fraud detection in the field of forensic accounting is that there are significant differences in task
performance and knowledge requirements for the completion of investigation. For example, computer forensics
requires knowledge of computing systems, log files, graphics and other formats, and many other non-accounting
knowledges. Similarly, data theft prevention and investigation requires database knowledge, computer security
knowledge, encryption and computer systems (Albright, 2008, p.5).





In the field of forensic accounting, there are categories of investigation such as:
Data mining for fraud Techniques and methodologies for discovering fraud in corporate databases;
Financial statement fraud: Ratio analysis and other methods of finding financial statement
manipulation
External information sources: Information about perpetrator finances and other data, usually found in
websites; and,
Computer forensics: Investigating by sifting through computer hard drives and other information
devices.

Each context has its own challenges and ways of investigation. As a result, digital forensic software tools have to
declare capability before use. Otherwise a null or an erroneous result may be obtained from the tool as it is not
capable in a particular area, and yet fraud exists within the dataset. Therefore, till testing is a critical issue that
impacts potential evidential outcomes. Verification is required from approved by independent bodies and not just
proprietary vendor’s (Al Mutawa, et al., 2012, p.26). Researchers in the field suggested that it is vital for
investigators to compare the suitability of forensic tools in relation to various application environments (Guo &
Slay, 2010, p.297). Some have common views in analysis of large data (e.g. several terabytes) where tools
should be able to efficiently and effectively handle the volumes (Yannikos et al., 2011, p.200). Kimmel et al.,
(2012) recommended that an in – depth assessment of the tool based on requirements and an evaluation of
different packages and their functions within all available types of fraud pattern. What is missing from this
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advice are statements about how software forensic tools will stay up-to-date and adapt themselves to new
patterns of fraudulent activity (p.765).
In this paper we briefly review the problem area of relevancy for current digital forensic and accounting forensic
software tools. We then propose a focus for the development of accounting forensic tools that takes ratio analysis
and pattern recognition to be the foundational building block for the analysis. We then propose a fraud detection
model that is based on the similarity metric for determining the similarity of patterns and the proximity of data to
events. We conclude by recommending care in the use of current forensics software tools and emphasise the
necessity of tools being able to not only cope with big data but also complexity.

THE PROBLEM AREA
Forensic accounting is the application of accounting knowledge and investigative skills to identify and document
potential matters with legal implication for fraud and other financial crime (Houck et al., 2006, p.68). Forensic
accounting is a developing area of specialisation in the field of accounting. Its main concerned with the detection
and prevention of financial frauds and other forms of economic crime (Dhar and Sarkar, 2010, p.94). In the
accounting field, there are a number of ongoing activities that, collectively, allow business owners or managers
to access the information when they need it in order to make well informed decisions. In terms of business
operation, this includes basic transactions such as purchases and sales, and marketing and strategic planning as
well as summative information. Accounting refers to financial record keeping and data reporting that businesses
engage in to meet legal requirements and keep the organisation’s stakeholders informed of the organization's
financial position at any point of the year. Accounting is defined as a systematic process of identifying,
recording, measuring, classifying, verifying, summarizing, interpreting and communicating financial
information. It reveals profit or loss for a given period, and the value and nature of a firm's assets, liabilities and
owners' equity (Business Dictionary, 2016, p.1). However, the financial statement will only be as good as the
journal entries (Haber, 2004, p.7). Missing or fraudulent journal entries will produce financial statement that is
fraudulent (Basuhail, 2010, p.97).
Financial statements are prepared to present fair information about the financial position, operating performance
of the organisation or the business. The international standards on auditing 240 stated that, fraud and error must
be considered when auditing financial statements (Smith et al., 2008, p.18). Furthermore, the auditor must
perform procedures to assist the entity in the detection of fraud (Council, 2013, p.13). As a result of the Enron
and WorldCom failures (Reinstein and McMillan, 2004, p.956), the accounting arena had undergone
fundamental changes to redress the shortcomings found in previous audit requirements. Therefore, a new market
with a new class of accountants known as forensic accountants has emerged. The white collar crimes is in focus
and occupational fraud. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) estimates that occupational fraud
losses cost organizations $994 billion annually (Davis et al., 2010, p.5; Crumbley et al., 2005, p.400). Forensic
accounting and fraud examination are different but related. Forensic accounting work is done by accountants in
anticipation of litigation and can include fraud, valuation, bankruptcy and a host of other professional services.
Fraud examinations can be conducted by either accountants or non-accountants and refer only to anti-fraud
matters (Wells, 2003, p.76).

DIGITAL FORENSIC SOFTWARE TOOLS
The amount of data stored in accounting files requires digital management. This means that relevant and
appropriate software must be available to process the data and to extract the relevant information. Forensic
investigation and the analysis of accounting data for fraudulent patterns has become more and more complex
(Albano, et al., 2011, p.381). Digital forensics integrates the fields of computer science and law to investigate
crime (Dezfouli, et al., 2012, p.186). For any digital evidence to be used in court, investigators must follow a
proper set of procedures when collecting and analysing data from computer systems (Jansen & Ayers, 2007,
p.6). Hence the interface between the investigator and the data is mediated by software but due to the differences
in terms of the technologies, investigators will have to engage different methods and tools depending on the
category of information involved (Albano, et al., 2011, p.381). Therefore, prior to acquiring data from a
comprised device, extra cautions must be taken, standard procedures and base practises must be followed
carefully. This is to avoid altering data in the process because digital data can be easily corrupted (Jansen &
Ayers, 2007, p.45). The first challenge for forensic software tools is the bridging of the structures, protocols, and
designs in which the data resides. The second challenge is then to be able to identify accurately patterns of
conformance, compliance, and aberrations that may occur within the data (Ayers, 2007, p.1). Each tool has a
different core set of features that are designed to deliver specific outcomes (NIST, 2013, p.4). Reliable digital
forensic techniques are therefore important for prevention, detection, and investigation of electronic crime
(Nissan, 2012, p.843). For example, in table 1 and analysis has been completed of different accounting forensic

18

and digital forensic tools that may be employed in an investigation. The analysis shows that each tool has a
different capability and that some do overlap. However, an investigator has to be fully aware of these limitations
before a tool is selected or used for forensic accounting purposes (Mohtasebi & Dehghantanha, 2013, 353). For
most the integrity of the evidences and its admissibility in the court of law has to be preserved. As a result, it is
critical for an investigator to know the reliability and accuracy of the tool (Kubi et al., 2011, p.2) and to select
one’s that are to be effective and efficient in the particular situation.
Table 1. Experiment results (Grispos, et al., 2011, p.30).

Keys that the authors used in Table 3.2 are F = Full, P = Partial, D = Detected and N = Not.
In spite of everything, all logical data can be acquired and analysed yet, tool developers seem to over claim their
tool’s support while the tool can only obtain some of the requirements. As a result, forensic tools should be
evaluated based on their abilities and not the costs. For example, a tool may have better support for a particular
brand of operating system or device (Morrissey, 2010, p.130). Many of the current software tools for forensic
investigation may not be used in financial related investigation beyond the extraction of data because they do not
discriminate sufficiently at the higher complexity levels. A forensic accountant requires detection of fraud in
financial statement reports which is more than just extracting the report data. As a result, the abstraction of
models is required to detect fraud in a financial report.

ACCOUNTING RATIOS
The initial design of the proposed model was developed based on the learning from the analysis of the literature,
formulated to fill the gap, and avoid repetition. The reading and analysis gain sufficient abstraction that the
modelling system would rest above the data level. The result is a tentative detection model for financial fraud
that requires testing and validation. The initial design of the financial fraud detection model comprises of five
financial ratios - Return on Assets (ROA), Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio, Current Ratio, Total Asset
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Turnover and Inventory Turnover. The implication is that for a financial report - which brings together many
segregated areas – financial ratios from each of the implicated areas are required comparison against the industry
standard or a benchmark from the trend analysis ratios (Albano, et al., 2011). Models are an abstraction of a
process to examine potential evidence, irrespective of the originality of the evidence (Peisert, et al., 2008, p.116).
Forensic experts also believe that forensic investigation process models generalise an informal procedure to
deliver a framework. That framework provides a detailed understanding of what each process is to do and not do.
Jankun-Kelly, et al. (2007) explained that the model and framework provides an effective means to acquire
information within the process. These processes are used to capture relevant aspects of the investigation (p.357).
A breakdown of each ratio for building into the tool is as follows:
Return on Assets (ROA), Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio, Current Ratio, Total Asset Turnover
and Inventory Turnover: If an organisation or business is subject to an audit, the auditors will review its
accounts receivable in some detail. Accounts receivable is frequently the largest asset that a company has, so
auditors tend to spend a considerable amount of time gaining assurance that the amount of the stated asset is
reasonable
Return on Assets:
A measure of the return on total investment; It is sometimes desirable to add interest to after tax profits to form
the numerator of the ratio since total assets are financed by creditors as well as by stockholders; hence, it is
accurate to measure the productivity of assets by the returns provided to both classes of investors.
Current ratio:
Indicates the extent to which the claims of short-term creditors are covered by assets that are expected to be
converted to cash in a period roughly corresponding to the maturity of the liabilities.
Total assets turnover:
A measure of the utilization of all the firm's assets; a ratio below the industry average indicates the company is
not generating a sufficient volume of business, given the size of its asset investment.
Inventory turnover:
When compared to industry averages, it provides an indication of whether a company has excessive or perhaps
inadequate finished goods inventory.
Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio: Shows the relationship between unpaid sales and the total sales
revenue. It is considered high if it is near to 1.0, because that means a significant amount of cash is tied up with
the slow paying customers. Formula: Total accounts receivable (outstanding in an accounting period) ÷ sales
revenue (in the same period).
Accounts Receivable (A/R) turnover = Average credit sale/Accounts Receivable: Ratio that shows the
relationship between unpaid credit sales to total credit sales. It indicates, in general, the effectiveness (or lack of
it) of a firm's credit policies and cash collection efforts. Formula: Outstanding accounts receivable (in an
accounting period) ÷ credit sales revenue (in the same period), also called receivable turnover.

FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS
Financial analysis techniques can help investigators discover and examine unexpected relationships in financial
information (Davis, et al., 2010). These analytical procedures are based on the premise that relatively stable
relationships exist among economic events in the absence of conditions to the contrary. Known contrary
conditions which cause unstable relationships to exist might include unusual or nonrecurring transactions or
events, and accounting, environmental, or technological changes. Public companies experiencing these events
must disclose and explain the facts in their financial statements. Increasingly, private and not-for-profit
companies follow best practices and do the same. Financial ratios are a great way to analyse a company’s
strengths and weaknesses. Ratios convert financial information to standardised format that can be used to
compare with other companies and industry expectations. Unexpected deviations in relationships most likely
indicate errors, but also might indicate illegal acts or fraud (Kovalerchuk et al., 2007). Therefore, deviations in
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expected relationships warrant further investigation to determine the exact cause. Several methods of analysis
assist the reader of financial reports in highlighting the areas that most likely represent fraudulent accounting
methods (Dhar et al., 2010). An understanding of general relationships between certain financial statement
balances is necessary to identify relationships that appear unusual. If sales increase, how should the cost of sales
respond? If commission expense decreases, what would be expected of sales? Answers to questions such as
these are the foundation of financial analysis. The following relationships are general, and traditionally occur
between financial accounts; however, unique circumstances may render different results. The following is a
worked example:
For the current year, ABC Ltd reported the following ratios:
-ROA = 20%
- Asset Turnover (being Sales/Average Total Assets) = 2.5 times
- Net Profit Margin = 15%
QUESTION: Why would we suspect at least one of these ratios is not correct?
We must be able to identify a relationship between the given ratios:
ROA = Net Income/Average Total Assets
ASSET TURNOVER = Sales/Average Total Assets
NET PROFIT MARGIN = Net Income/ Sales
Now, we can look at the common factors:
ROA and ASSET TURNOVER both use Average Total Assets
ROA and NET PROFIT MARGIN both use Net Income
ASSET TURNOVER and NET PROFIT MARGIN both use Sales
Now, we can look at the values provided:
ROA = 0.20

ASSET TURNOVER = 2.5 NPM = 0.15

We can then prove these values are not consistent. This can be done either by using algebra, or by simply assuming a
value for one of the common factors. In this case, let’s assume average total assets equal $100 (although any value
can be chosen to prove if the ratios are consistent).
If that is the case;

Then:

Net income/100 = 0.20

(so Net Income = 20)

Sale / 100 = 2.50

(so Sales = 250)

Net Income / Sales would have to be: 20 / 250 =0.08

Conclusion: NPM of 15% is not consistent with the values of ROA = 20% and
Asset Turnover = 2.5 times.

These ratios may also reveal frauds other than accounting frauds. If an employee is embezzling from the
company’s accounts, for instance, the amount of cash will decrease disproportionately and the current ratio will
decline. Liability concealment will cause a more favourable ratio. Similarly, a cheque-tampering scheme will
usually result in a decrease in current assets, namely cash, which will, in turn, decrease the current ratio. In fact,
these frauds may be more easily detected with ratio analysis because employees other than management would
not have access to accounting cover-ups of non-accounting frauds. Anomalies in ratios could point directly to the
existence of fraudulent actions. Accounting frauds can be much more subtle and demand extensive investigation
beyond the signal that something is out of the norm.

THE PROPOSED FRAUD DETECTION MODEL
The Euclidean Distance based similarity metric is to evaluate the similarity of the standard industry ratios
(Return on Assets (ROA), Accounts Receivable (A/R) to sales ratio, Current Ratio, Total Asset Turnover and
Inventory Turnover) against the ratios of the current financial statement in order to determine if a fraud has
occurred. Bajcsy and Kovačič (1989) argued that defining the problem will be the best way to understand the
nature of the problem in its entirety. To evaluate the similarity between two different objects, x and y, a distance
metric known as Euclidean Distance (EU) is used, this defines as follows:
(1)
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This metric can be generalized into n-dimensions points, such that a={x1, x2, … xn} and b={y1, y2, …, yn}. In this
case, n-dimensions EU metric is defined as:

=

(2)

Let L1 and L2 be the existing standard industry ratios and the current financial statement ratios, respectively. Let
xi represent each ratio from the standard industry ratios and yi represent each ratios from the financial statement,
where i={1, 2, …, n} and n is the total number of ratios. In this case, L1 ={x1, x2, …, xn} and L2 ={y1, y2, …, yn}.
Euclidean distance can be normalized into a distance based similarity as follow:
(3)
Similarity normalized EU into a value in between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 means that the two objects are
identical and a value of 0 means that the two objects are not identical. This study focuses on detecting financial
fraud and identifying the means of the fraud. In order to detect the fraud, the similarity between the industry
standard ratios and the ratios of the current financial report is ranked. In doing so, the Euclidean distance
between L1 and L2 is calculated first by using equation (1) and then the similarity can be ranked based on
equation (3).
For example:
Using equation 1, if the industry standard for Return on assets: profit after tax/total assets = 1.5 and in the
current financial report its 2.5 therefore it is calculated as follows:

=
=1
In order to normalise this into a value in between 0 to 1, use the similarity metric as showed in equation 3
= 0.5
The result is interpreted from predefined tabulated charts or user constructed tables based on empirical sample
data constructed from use cases. The default setting is a result that falls between 0.5 and 1; and it indicates
acceptance, but if it falls below 0.5 then it signals a red flag. A red flag means that the data requires further
investigation. The metric acts as an indicator that eliminates possibilities rather than a deterministic measure that
nominates an outcome. It cannot be used in isolation from expert knowledge and practitioner experience but in
large datasets it can heighten the awareness of variations that are most likely indicate errors, and illegal acts or
fraud. Therefore, deviations in expected relationships warrant further investigation to determine the exact cause.

CONCLUSION
Current digital forensics tools when applied to forensic accounting came up inadequate in our testing because
they lack models that can sufficiently abstract from the data concerned. In this paper, the distance based
similarity metric was proposed as the method for detection and identification of fraud, and a solution to the
complexity problem. The result from the simple case developed to validate the method showed that the distance
based similarity metric can detect financial statement variations that are an advancement on the simple ratio
model tests and these variations can be mapped onto patterns of different activities, including fraud. It is also
evident in this study that the metric effectively improved the performance, effectiveness and efficiency of the
examination and analysis of large datasets of financial statements. This is helpful given the big data issues
surrounding accounting and audit practice. For future work, a use case database of reference tables is to be
developed from the application of this tool in industry so that the normalisation measure may be better matched
onto scenario and context based situations. In its current form the metric is an improvement on the current ratio
detection systems and has potential for coding into other digital forensic tools or into its own accounting forensic
tool.
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Abstract
The easy access and common usage of GNSS systems has provided a wealth of evidential information that may
be accessed by a digital forensic investigator. Google Earth is commonly used on all manner of devices for
geolocation services and consequently has a wide range of tools that will relate real time and stored GNSS data
to maps. As an aid to investigation Google Earth forensics is available for use. An investigator can use it by
downloading geolocation data from devices and placing it on Google Earth maps, place geolocation data on
historical archival maps, or by direct usage of the application in a device. In this paper we review the Google
Earth forensics tool and use a simplistic scenario to demonstrate the power of the application for courtroom
walk-throughs. The entry-level tool is free and can be used effectively to enhance the presentation of geolocation
data.
Keywords
Digital Forensics, Location based service, GNSS, Google Earth forensics, Investigation

INTRODUCTION
Advancements in technology over the last 20 years have drastically altered the way people live
and do business (Garfinkel, et al., 2009, p.3). The advancements have driven the growth of popularity and
usages of mobile devices such as Smartphones and all the related application packages. This growth is expected
to continue for the foreseeable future and the mobile devices market to expand (Liu, et al., 2012, p.145). The
increasing storage capacity and functionality of these mobile devices have outnumbered personal computers and
become the personal device of choice in our society. Large amounts of information from phone book to photo
albums and videos, to emails and text messages, to financial records and GNSS (Global Satellite Positioning
System) records, are stored in these phones (Mylonas, et al., 2012, p.249). Mobile devices have the ability to
network especially via wireless connections such as Wi-Fi, cellular network such as 3G and 4G (Liu, et al.,
2012). Mobile devices are relatively small, portable and widely used by all ages, and especially by young people.
Mobile devices consist of Smartphones, Tablets, embedded devices, Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), and a
range of evolving products (Bennett, 2012, p.159). The personalisation and control handed to the user make
these anytime, anywhere devices the communication device of choice. The end user finds the usefulness,
capability, numerous applications, high processing power and improved communication performance, to be in
line with their demand for experience (Yusoff, et al., 2014, p.141).
Mobile phone forensics is defined by the National Institutes of Standards and Technology as, the science of
recovering digital evidence from a mobile phone under forensically sound conditions using accepted methods
(Jansen & Ayers, 2007, p.6). The new generation of digital mobile devices are known as Smart devices because
of their processing power, memory and storage spaces that are very similar to that of a desktop computer.
However, the operating system that runs on these Smart devices has its own file system and structure. On Smart
devices, the operating system functions come from volatile memory whereas with computers it is in RAM and
ROM. These Smart devices are capable of storing, transmitting and processing large amounts of private and
confidential data (Owen & Thomas, 2011, p.25). Yet, the main challenge to forensic experts is the fact that
Smart devices are different proprietary designs, software, and access controls. As a result, forensic experts must
stay up-to-date with the latest technology in order to be able to adapt to technological changes and strategize new
approaches (Rajendran and Gopalan, 2016, p.394).
The affordability of these devices, the proliferation of wireless hotspots and the availability of wireless
location services have created new business opportunities and demand for use (Karygiannis and Antonakakis,
2009, p.308). This has led the researchers in the field to find a way of providing location based services to
mobile clients.
This paper is structured to review previous literature on geolocation services, to review Google Earth forensic
capability, and then to provide a test scenario and walk-through. The results are then discussed to elicit the
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implications for practice. The conclusion is that Google Earth is a powerful tool to visualise location data in
context. However, it is important to practice with the tool and then to use forensic examination procedures to
collect and to manage the evidence. This ensures the best opportunity that the findings can be admissible in the
court of law.

PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Recently, the mobile sensing data are used for analysing users’ activities such as, their emotions, health
conditions, their usage patterns and social relationships. This is done in order to study and understand human’s
behaviour (Mo, et al., 2015, p.391). These studies were triggered by the widespread use of highly capable and
multifunctional Smart devices, collecting and analysing mobile sensing data are given more attention in recent
years. These days, Smartphones are very much part of people’s everyday lives and including recreation. User’s
takes these Smart devices along everywhere they go. These Smart devices such as Smartphones consist of
various sensors and technologies. As a result, they collect a variety of information such as the user’s locations,
activities, phone calls, SMS, e-mails, call logs, contact list, applications, and so on. Recently, various smart
application services have been developed using GNSS, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) and sensor
network connectivity.
The GNSS has been successfully applied for outdoor location tracking by many applications, but it might still be
insufficient in an indoor environment where GNSS signals are often severely obstructed.
Location Based Services
Researchers in the field have been working on the possibility of providing location based services (LBSs) to
mobile clients. Researchers believed that such technology can be very helpful if available indoors in places like
shopping malls, train stations, airports and universities for sharing information, schedule change of train and
flight, and so on (Sadhukhan, et al., 2010, p.10). As a result, the indoor location tracking systems has shown its
importance for personal information use. GNSS is the well-known and commonly used technology for providing
location information services. Location Based Services (LBS) on the other hand, has limitations of dependency
on satellite visibility and problems with accuracy and consistency of service in cities, covered areas and multipath contexts (Kim, et al., 2014, p.89). Mobile RFID applications has been utilised to play a role in the
implementation of an indoor tracking system for exhibition service (Kim et al., 2014, p.96). RFID-Based
Navigation System is utilised to reduce localization errors (Reza and Buehrer, 2012, p.1023). However, the
intensity of experience that satisfies end user geolocation requirements is driving use of positioning technology
for security applications, quality control in manufacturing, and safety applications in high-risk areas (Werner,
2014a, p.74).
Location-based services are built by detecting the environments of a mobile device. The inherent complexities of
buildings and the localization problem inside buildings that make most indoor location based services use a large
amount of environmental information from various sources (Werner, 2014b, p.169). Nonetheless, it’s always
being sufficient to detect the location of the user with regards to the planned route. The navigational events
consist of directional changes yet, inside buildings, the people are missing the navigational experience (Werner,
2014b, p.169).

Mobile Sensing
In order to understand human’s behaviours, mobile sensing data is collected and analysed to show activities,
usage patterns, emotions, health conditions and social relationships (Mo, et al., 2015, p.391). The customer
location tracking system is also used to send location specific information advertisements to users via their
mobile Smart device (Keikhosrokiani, et al., 2011, p.527). A mobile smart device such as Smartphones has the
characteristics of personalization. As a result, they are utilised to develop a platform for home care for the
elderly combining with alarm clock. This allows the device to remind the patients to take their medicine (Cheng,
et al., 2011, p.259). Sensor-equipped mobile device revolutionised sectors of our economy including business,
healthcare, social networks, environmental monitoring, and transportation (Lane et al., 2010, p.140). Also UltraHigh Frequency (UHF) RFID technology has been applied to supply chain, asset tracking, antifraud system and
intelligent transportation systems and so on (Eo, et al., 2008, p.730). RFID technology on Smart devices
incorporates the RFID technology with the cellular network. This allows access to information stored on the tag
through the RFID reader on the Smart device such as Smartphone (Peng, et al., 2012, p.243). RFID technologies
have been utilised in retail to track inventory, in manufacturing to track product status, and also in airlines to
track lost baggage (Wang, et al., 2009, p.495). However, researchers in the field have identified two primary
types of GNSS location traces - location-only and location-based. Location uses the reference data for visual
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inspection to infer trip purposes (Wolf et al., 2003, p.6). Location-based studies on the other hand, incorporate
other supplementary data such as related trip information (Schönfelder et al., 2003, p.8; Stopher et al., 2008,
p.2).
Location Value
Location plays a key role in defining the nature of human activities. Location can determine users’ requirements,
buying behaviours and service choices (Rao and Minakakis, 2003, p.63). If the provider knows the user’s exact
location and has the ability to target valuable information, the benefits can be reciprocated. However, awareness
of the user’s location is only part of the problem (Schönfelder, et al., 2003, p.1). The Human trajectories3
application has sets of time-stamped locations describing individuals’ movements in time (typically over a day),
and are potentially of great use for many different interested parties. On their own, they reveal the fundamentals
of human mobility patterns (Gonzalez et al., 2008, p.780). Therefore, human-carried mobile devices, routing and
broadcasting algorithms deployed in various cellular networks should take advantage of the properties of human
mobility in order to be effective (Marin et al., 2014, p.204). Thus, based on the where, how, why, when, and who
with, users’ are routing. Someone can be in a rugby game with friends most likely to have different LBS profile
from that of a person on a routine trip to the supermarket or shopping mall. If the provider has the ability to
deliver reliable information to users, they might have difficulty identifying what the user is doing or looking for
at that location (Heinemann and Gaiser, 2015, p.55). All of these matters can become evidential and in this day
and age they are stored digitally.
Significant developments and advances in the field of wireless communication technologies, location sensors
and global networking, are driving a new world (Saha and Mukherjee, 2003, p.25). The Smartphone generation
is accustomed to the connected world; it becomes a custom to be connected to any person, anytime, anywhere. In
fact, people want to be able to monitor and control everything in their lives at anytime from anywhere
(Siewiorek, 2012, p.323). However, in the inter-connected world, people prefer not to only limit to Smart
devices only. The Internet is being extended to connect every device around us, and is generally known as the
Internet of Things (IoT) and the Internet of Everything (IoE). IoT is a concept of a dynamic that is constantly
building up and escalating into a future technology full immersion experience (Jun, et al., 2011, p.3). According
to Kantarci and Mouftah (2015), IoT interconnects billions of objects that are uniquely identifiable and that have
communications, computing and sensing functionalities (p.1865). In such an environment, the acquired data
mainly used to analyse human’s behaviour, looking for patterns that can be useful in location based service
(Vlassenroot, et al., 2015, p.19). However, in some cases even if the data is stored offline, the size of the data is
so large and distributed; it will require the use of big data analytical tools for processing (Aggarwal et al., 2013,
p.383). Big data comes from various sources, in this case, the location based service sensor, the mobile device
GNSS signals, sensors used to gather climate information, social networking sites data, digital photos and
videos, and so on. These data is known as Big Data, and analysing such data sets strengthens new streams of
productivity growth, innovation, and consumer surplus. Learning gained from the result of analysing Big Data
can help to answer human technology immersion and proximity questions (Ciobanu, et al., 2014, p.4). In
addition all of this data and information can become evidential and useful to forensic investigation.

GOOGLE EARTH REVIEW
Google Earth Forensics is a practical and easily accessible tool kit for using with Google Earth Geo-Location
services. Google Earth (GE) is a tool that enables its users to view the planet through a virtual globe. Users can
navigate through satellite images, aerial photography, and even views of street level imagery and 3D models of
the world. This includes locations like oceans, the moon, Mars, and outer space. Features in GE allows tours of
locations, historical archive mapping, and to fly across locations using a flight simulator (Harrington and Cross,
2015, p.1). GE provides a representation to real locations within the material limitations of the data collected and
the visual presentation. When a location is entered into GE, a map will display and it will include the labelled
position of the place you are searching for. It will also allow zooming to see 3D structures or actual photos of a
location. GE also allows the viewing of areas of the earth using custom maps or overlays which contain data
imported from GNSS units and other digital devices. It is an information source and geolocation search
application for multiple usages (Parks, 2009, p.537).
GE is known to be utilised by Police throughout the world in various ways to investigate crimes and share
information with the general public. Analysts in law enforcement agencies gather data from police reports and
other sources and made it available through GE. For instance, the Shawnee Police Department in Kansas
provides data that can be loaded into GE to see locations where robberies, auto thefts, vandalism and other
crimes have taken place (Shawnee PD, 2010, p.1). In the digital forensics domain, knowing where a computer or
device has been is very important in an investigation. However, we are living in an age where mobility is highly
vital. As a result, knowing the exact location of a device when involved in a certain activity is vital information
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to a forensic investigator (Google Earth Forensics, 2015, p.1). It is possible to chart user’s movements from data
found on Smartphones from metadata of a photo and other media. The data by itself, however, may not mean
much. It needs to be translated into a meaningful form. Perkins and Dodge (2009) argued that, secrets are
strongly associated with visual culture, where they are hidden from view but may be revealed. They are
ubiquitous, but often unseen and are particularly associated with certain spaces. Google Earth Forensics (2015)
note that, many devices store location data as a matter of course – even, sometimes, when the user has asked it
not to (p.546).
Forensics is the use of scientific or technological techniques to investigate and establish facts. In a criminal case,
the facts you are looking for will be evidence of how a crime was committed and who was responsible
(Harrington and Cross, 2015, p.4). Throughout a process of preserving the crime scene and identifying,
gathering and examining evidence, information is carefully documented. This is used in the hopes of
understanding what occurred, and so that it may be used to identify, arrest and convict the perpetrator (Takeuchi,
et al., 2012, p.183). GE can be used to search and display location-specific information in a way that is more
telling than the raw data. Using GE as a forensic tool, you can also:




Import data from mobile devices and GNSS units to determine a route that was taken, or locations that a
person visited
Determine the location where a photo was taken using geo-location information stored in a digital picture
Create maps that display locations that a device visited, and movies that covey location-based information in
a compelling format for investigations and court presentation

The following screenshots illustrate the use of Google forensics for the processing of data taken from a mobile
device. XRY (figure 1) is used as the extraction tool and then the data is imported into Google forensics to
demonstrate its usefulness. The screen shot show a step-by-step process guide for the use of the tool and
instruction for others who wish to use it.
Harrington and Cross (2015) stated that, GE can be incorporated into various phases of the digital forensic
procedure. Most often, users may surprise to know that it is used in later parts of a case, when coordinates from
various sources needs to be analysed or a tool to create presentations relating to geographic locations. In some
cases, it may also be used to acquire GNSS data from a device, although other tools may be more suited to
collecting such data for a forensic investigation (p.73).
In this example, the XRY was used to acquire data from an iPhone 6 plus 64GB running on iOS 10.0.2. Figure 1
showed XRY logical was used to acquire the data from the iPhone 6 Plus. The XRY Reader v6.18 - 32bit as
showing in figure 2 is used to read and analyse the data. The forensic process was done on HP laptop running on
i7 processor with 8GB of RAM. Operating system is Microsoft Windows 10 Professional.

Figure 1: Preliminary view provided by XRY
The XRY Reader in figure 1 showed detailed information on the location data found and selected in the data
acquired. This information includes longitude, latitude, altitude, and also date, time, and a preview of the
location in google map. This location data can also be exported in various formats such as pdf, word, excel,
GPX, XML, HTML or GE.
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Figure 2: Exporting location data into Google Earth format
In this study, the location data was exported into GE format as shows in figure 2 and then opened with GE. For
this study, GE 7.1.7.2600 was used.
Figure 3 shows the result when the exported file is opened in GE. This shows a much clearer view of the
location showed in figure 2. GE itself is not a recognized or standardized forensic tool but has the functionality
to display geolocation data. All of the issues with accuracy and timeliness require declaration and any variations
reported. Figure 4 has the Google forensics import GNSS data panel.

Figure 3: Google Earth view

Figure 4: Google Earth GNSS import panel
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Compliance is important because any matter may be cross-examined or challenged in court. For instance, instead
of simply plugging the GNSS device directly into a USB port, it is highly recommended to make sure that a
software write protection or a hardware write blocker is used to prevent any accidental modification of data.
Acquiring the GNSS location data in this manner, it shows the number of waypoints, tracks and routes that are
imported from a GNSS device. However, importing GNSS data in this way has disadvantages because it copies
the data directly off the device into GE. It only performs a logical acquisition and does not retrieve any deleted
or even hidden data on the device.
To import the data direct in to GE, perform the following steps.
1) In GE, click on the Tools menu, and then click the GNSS menu item
2) When the GNSS Import dialog box appears select the type of device you are importing from. As our
scenario involves a Garmin GNSS unit, we would click the Garmin option to import from that device
3) In the Import section, select what you want to import: n Waypoints – these are individual locations marked
on the GNSS unit. n Tracks – these are where the GNSS has been. n Routes – these are a series of locations
where the user wishes to navigate.
4) In the Output section, select the output to be used with GE.
When ready to start obtaining data, clicking the Import button, GE will import the data from the device. A
summary of the imported data will be displayed on the screen once finished.

APPLICATION OF GOOGLE EARTH FORENSICS
In the previous section a step-by-step guide has been provided on how to use GE with Google forensics. In this
section, a simple scenario is adopted to demonstrate how generated data can be displayed as a courtroom walkthrough.
“Alleged young children kidnapping and trafficking”
A deal gone wrong and from the crime scene, a mobile Smart device was found and suspected of being involved
in some criminal activities. As a result, the Smart phone was taken back to the lab for processing. Upon
examination of the Smart phone, there were several geotagged photographs which led the investigator to look at
the geolocation data on the device.
In this case, the geolocation file has been acquired from the device, and the location data can be imported into
GE. In GE, the placemarks can also be modified. This is a commonly used feature and very important for
pinpointing locations and presenting information regarding a crime scene in this case or even other places related
to a case. To add a placemark in GE, click on the Add Placemark button on the toolbar.

Figure 5: Customising placemark dialog
Fill out the upper portion of the dialog with the information shown in Figure 5 and click OK when done. Once
the location file from the Smart device is loaded into GE, it displays the waypoints as shown in figure 6.

30

Figure 6: Waypoints
In relation to the case scenario, the illustration in figure 6 showed the places in the public park where the events
are located. Zooming in to get a ground level view, allows a representation of the crime scene in threedimensional space. The images can be overlaid with evidence as it has been collected and GNSS located.
Placemarks in GE can be customised according to the nature of the case depending whether it is a phone, a
vehicle or other matter at the crime scene. It is not only the placemarks but also content may be added to
describe area around the placemark to link it to reports and photographs and narratives. In this way threedimensional and historical image mapping may be used to reconstruct a crime scene and presented in visual
format in a courtroom.

CONCLUSION
Access to Google forensics is extremely helpful to all forensic investigators. The entry-level packages is free and
provides considerable capability to process and demonstrate geolocation data. Geolocation and psycho location
data are readily available from Smart devices in this day and age and provide a whole multidimensional image of
human behaviour. In this paper we have provided a step-by-step guide as to how to use the tool and to apply it to
a courtroom walk-through. We have also cautioned that acceptable forensic practices must also be used for the
data acquisition and management processes. Further research and demonstration of historical archiving Google
forensics capability can also be helpful in cold cases.
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Abstract

A Faraday bag is designed to shield a mobile phone or small digital device from radio waves entering the bag
and reaching the device, or to stop radio waves escaping through the bag from the device. The effectiveness of
these shields is vital for security professionals and forensic investigators who seize devices and wish to ensure
that their contents are not read, modified or deleted prior to a forensic examination. This research tests the
effectiveness of several readily available Faraday bags. The Faraday bags tested are all available through
online means and promise complete blocking of all signals through the bag. Additionally, other materials that
can be used if a Faraday bag is not available, such as tin foil and a tin can are tested and compared with the
Faraday bags. A selection of common mobile phones from various manufacturers is tested in the shielding
material. Additionally, 3G / 4G, WiFi and Bluetooth are tested with the bags and materials on those so
equipped devices to ascertain whether the material blocks all signals from communicating technologies on the
phones. Results show that performance of the bags is not as promised by most vendors and that in urgent
situations other materials at hand may suffice to perform the same function as a Faraday bag.
Keywords
privacy, security, shielding, mobile, forensics, Faraday bags

INTRODUCTION
The utilisation of smart mobile devices plays a key role in the majority of day-to-day lives, where most carry at
least one electronic device, whether they be for corporate use as a portable office, or personal use for tasks such
as social networking and entertainment (Rajendran & Gopalan, 2016). This reliance on smartphones is credited
to their proven advantages regarding efficiency in fulfilling both personal needs and business development,
supported by the influx of availability and variety of mobile devices and their compatible applications (Khan,
Abbas, & Al-Muhtadi, 2015). Current mobile devices, specifically the smartphone, combine telephony and
computer services in a convenient handheld device. Standard telephone services are provided through a cellular
network, while Internet services are utilised through a Wi-Fi connection or via 3G and 4G cellular data networks
(Soukup, 2015). Google’s Android, and Apple’s iOS are the two main platforms which dominate today’s mobile
market (FireEye, 2015), with the everyday use of smart devices steadily increasing, while the utilisation and
cost of basic feature phones and personal computers continually fall (Ophoff & Robinson, 2014). Where older
models of mobile phones could only store a limited amount of data, which was easily obtainable by forensic
investigators, the increased popularity and development of smart devices has complicated the techniques which
must be employed by forensic investigators in order to retrieve the many variants of stored data in a forensically
sound manner (Bennett, 2012).

LITERATURE REVIEW
A mobile device must have at least one wireless network interface to allow for data communications, whether it
be Wi-Fi, cellular networking or additional technologies which can be used for connecting a device to networks
or the Internet, as well as providing built-in data storage. In order to be considered a mobile device, the device
must host an operating system which is not considered a complete operating system such as found on a desktop
or laptop and have compatible applications which are available through multiple means. The smartphone has
been described by Androulidakis (2016) as one of the most characteristic digital devices of current times, with
its pervasion into everyday life and worldwide distribution.
Over time, an abundance of data is collected and stored on a smartphone based on its use, which is strongly
correlated to the device’s owner or primary user. This stored data has become increasingly sought after and may
be involved in court trials to support the solving of crimes with evidence which can be retrieved from the
device. Some types of evidence which can be extracted from a mobile phone as identified by Androulidakis
(2016), include; device location, which can be based on the serving base location or GPS data; association of
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contacts, based on call logs which detail incoming and outgoing calls to and from the device; and
communication content such as messages and emails which may have been sent, received or stored on the
handset. Digital Evidence has been defined by the National Institute of Justice (2016) as information which is
stored or transmitted in binary form which can be relied on in court. Digital evidence has grown from being
primarily associated with electronic crime to now being utilised to support the prosecution of all crimes due to
the nature of information which individuals store on their personal devices it may be possible to derive critical
evidence regarding criminal intent, whereabouts in relation to a crime, or relationships to other suspects or
involved parties.
As identified by Rajendran and Gopalan (2016) in their mobile forensics investigation lifecycle process, once a
digital device has been acquired, and information regarding the devices specifications and its surroundings upon
acquisition have been gathered, the immediate action which needs to be taken is disabling the device from not
only the mobile network and the Internet, but also disabling Bluetooth, tethering, and any other kind of external
connections. Androulidakis (2016) states that the main principle of digital forensics is the preservation of data.
This supports the idea of data preservation and network isolation as a compulsory measure to ensure that data
cannot be altered in order to stand up in court. In the case that digital evidence has been altered, which can occur
due to data which can change or destroy the contents of a mobile device being received or transferred, a court
case can be lost. Incoming traffic from the network such as phone calls, messages or communication with
installed apps can result in the contamination of potential evidence. In addition to this incoming traffic, it is
possible that destruction mechanisms could be configured on the device which can result in the deletion of data
or the locking of the device (Androulidakis, 2016). The following step in the aforementioned lifecycle is to
ensure the preservation of the smartphone’s data. It is suggested by Rajendran and Gopalan (2016), in order to
support data preservation, that electronic devices be stored in a Faraday bag.
Faraday bags are described by Doherty (2016) as similar in appearance to antistatic bags, with the difference
being that an antistatic bag will prevent damage to electronic devices from static electrical charges which have
built up, whereas a Faraday bag poses the purpose of protecting electronic devices from external connectivity.
Faraday bags are based on the concept of the Faraday cage, which is an enclosure which prevents external
signals from reaching electronic devices. Doherty (2016) details the effectiveness of a Faraday bag being reliant
on the materials of which it is made, the purpose of which is to stop wireless signals from penetrating the bag
and reaching the device, which in turn supports the protection of the devices integrity from external influences.
While awaiting examination, it is crucial that effective measures are taken which prevent any data which is
stored on a device from being altered or remotely destroyed. Gershowitz (2013) identifies three operations
which could be utilised in order to protect device integrity without utilising changes to the running applications
so as switching off WiFi or entering Airplane Mode, these are: an extraction device that can copy phone
contents to a secure offsite location; a Faraday bag; or alternatively a piece of aluminium foil. The benefits of
the data extraction device at the time of seizure are evident. However, it is likely that high costs will be
associated with such a device and it is unlikely that a forensic investigator or Police Officer will have such a
device with them at all times. The benefit of using a Faraday bag is that once inside, a phone is no longer able to
communicate with any external sources, and in turn, external sources are unable to reach a phone which is
stored in a Faraday bag.
Generally, the primary material which Faraday bags are made from is aluminium foil, which suggests that the
utilisation of a simple solution such as wrapping a mobile device in aluminium foil may provide many of the
same benefits as a Faraday bag. Although it is possible that aluminium foil may not completely prevent all
attempts at communication with the wrapped device, it may act as a suitable intermediary process between the
seizure of the device and the secure transportation and storage of a device until further actions can be taken with
the potential evidence. In support of the Faraday option Androulidakis (2016) suggests that the best solution for
isolating a device from the network and preserving its data is the use of a “Faraday Cage” which isolates
electromagnetic radiation. It is stated that Faraday bags are smaller, more convenient option for device isolation.
Ayers et al. (2014) define evidence preservation as the process for securely maintaining custody of a digital
device without its contents being altered, and is the first step in digital evidence recovery. Incorrect procedures,
or improper handling of a device can cause the loss or alteration of digital data. An inability to correctly
preserve evidence can forfeit a whole investigation, and potentially lead to the loss of a legal case due to the
acquired evidence being disrupted and therefore not standing up in court (Ayers et al., 2014). NIJ (2008) detail
recommended items which first responders should have to comprise a “digital evidence collection toolkit” to
assist them in performing their investigation in a forensically sound manner. Within this toolkit, alongside
notepads, gloves, and a camera for documenting evidence, it is suggested that radio frequency shielding
materials be on hand in the case that smartphones or other mobile communication devices are involved in an
investigation and need to be securely seized. The specific radio frequency shielding materials which are
suggested by NIJ (2008) are Faraday isolation bags, or aluminium foil.
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NIJ (2008) emphasise the importance of leaving a mobile device in the power state in which it was found. If the
phone is on when the first responders arrive, the phone should be left on, if it is powered off, then it should
remain off; the device should then be packaged in a material which will shield it from incoming signals, in
preparation for secure transportation. In contrast to this, SWDGE (2011) state that in the event a mobile device
cannot be processed immediately, it should be powered off, its battery removed, and not turned back on.
Benefits of turning mobile devices off include: the preservation of call logs and last cell tower location
information (LOCI); avoiding overwriting of deleted data; stopping remote data destruction signals from
reaching the device; and preventing accidental device usage such as messaging, dialling, and accessing and
altering files and data. The risks of switching off the mobile device can result in the activation of security and
authentication mechanisms such as PIN codes and passwords which further restrict access to the devices content
(SWDGE, 2011). However, in support of NIJ’s (2008) claims, SWDGE (2011) state that in the event a mobile
device must remain powered on, it should then be isolated from the network. Rather than suggesting the use of
radio frequency shielding material to avoid the mobile device communicating with cell towers and in turn,
altering the phones data, SWDGE (2011) propose that mobile devices can be switched to “Airplane” mode to
limit their access to the towers, and where practical, first responders should disable the device’s WiFi,
Bluetooth, RFID, and infrared communications. Whilst the guidelines provide for a range of procedures which
at times are conflicting, it was decided for the purpose of these experiments that a forensic investigator would
likely place the phone in a Faraday bag or other shielding material without altering any settings or switching off
any technologies.
There is currently a paucity of empirical research on the effectiveness of common Faraday bags for mobile
signal shielding. There was even less available in regards to literature which provided findings, results or
suggestions in relation to alternative materials which may be utilised in the place of Faraday bags for the
purpose of blocking mobile signals from reaching a smartphone. That which could be derived from the literature
surrounding alternative materials is the effectiveness of tinfoil regarding the blocking of signals can be
attributed to its conductivity. This suggests that any conductive material such as copper, iron, and steel have the
potential to create a barrier between a mobile device and radio signals or at least cause interference between the
sending and receiving of frequency signals (Barrett, n.d.; Science Buddies, 2011).

RESEARCH DESIGN
The first step in the design of the experiments was to review several previous studies into shielding properties of
various materials. None of these studies provided all necessary steps that were suitable for this research so ideas
for testing were based on the previous research but with necessary modifications. As mobile devices may have
up to three different wireless technologies active, 3G / 4G, WiFi and Bluetooth, it was decided to test all three. It
was recognized that different phone manufacturers and models may provide differing results so six common
phones from three different manufacturers were chosen for the tests. Five easily available Faraday bags were
chosen for testing representing four different manufacturers. To compliment these dedicated Faraday bags and
to act as a comparison, tin foil and a tin can were added to test as these were materials that could likely be
located by an investigator at a scene when a Faraday bag is not available. The experimental design is described
in the following section.
Experimental Design
This research investigates the shielding and preservation capabilities of a range of different Faraday bags, with
the main research question to be addressed being: What is the capability of Faraday bags and alternative
materials for blocking mobile network, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth signals to mobile devices for the purpose of data
preservation? This research provides an opportunity to explore the effectiveness of materials in supporting
mobile evidence preservation in order to improve the mobile forensic investigation process. By providing a
comparison of a range of available Faraday bags, in addition to two alternative household materials which could
be used in the absence of Faraday bags, forensic investigators have the capability to identify materials which
may be beneficial to their investigations, and provide support to the preservation of potential evidence.
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Table 1: Experimental phones & materials
Mobile Devices
Samsung Galaxy S3
Samsung Galaxy S5
Samsung Galaxy S7
Sony Xperia Z5
Apple iPhone 5
Samsung GT-B2710

Tested with

Shielding Materials
Faraday Defence 3mm
Faraday Defence 7mm
EDEC Black Hole Faraday Bag
Blackout Faraday Shield
ESD Faraday Cage Bag
Aluminium foil & Tin can

Research Method
To ensure consistent results, the same method was implemented for each mobile device and Faraday bag
combination. The prerequisites for testing included:
 A fully charged battery, due to the high drain nature of the testing
 Device volume set to maximum to support identification of failed shielding where bags restrict vision
and interaction
 Installed and configured Viber application for placing and receiving calls through Wi-Fi connection
 Bluetooth turned on, device visibility set as discoverable, and discovery timeout set to “Never”
 Screen timeout set to the longest period available per device
 Mobile Data turned off as to not interfere with the Wi-Fi tests
Prior to shielding the receiving device, two calls will be placed, one over the network, and one over Wi-Fi,
using the Viber application, to ensure that all required features were functioning appropriately. In addition, a
Bluetooth search will be conducted from the transmitting device to ensure visibility of the phone being tested.
The mobile device is placed in a Faraday bag and a timer pre-set for 30 second intervals over the duration of
two minutes. Within every 30 second interval, a network call, and a Viber call is made from the transmission
device, to the shielded, reception device. If the communications are received by the shielded device, the test will
be considered a failure, and in the event no signals are received then a success is recorded. In the event the
majority of results for a specific shielding bag have failed, the shielded device is placed within another bag, so
that the device is nested within two bags of the same make and the testing process is then repeated. If after two
bags the results are still mostly failures, the testing process is performed again with three nested bags. If after
three nested bags the tests still fail, the Faraday bag in question will be considered completely ineffective.
Independent tests are conducted for Bluetooth connectivity to determine the effectiveness of the shielding
materials at varying distances, 1 metre, 3 metres, 5 metres and 10 metres. In the event of a failed test, the nesting
approach will not be implemented for the Bluetooth testing but instead the distance between the transmitting and
shielded receiving device will be increased. If after 10 metres Bluetooth communication can still be established,
the material being tested will be considered ineffective.

RESULTS
The 7 shielding materials, 5 Faraday bags, tin foil and a tin box were all tested using similar parameters. Of
primary interest is the 3G / 4G shielding capabilities as this is the communication technology that provides the
capability to alter the data on the phone from a considerable distance. The results of the experiments are shown
in figure 1 where the vertical bar represents a failure to shield the reception.
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Figure 1. 3G / 4G Call Failures
Of the 7 tested scenarios, only the EDEC Black Hole Faraday Bag and the aluminium foil shielded all 18 calls
from penetrating to the device. The time of the phone call had minimal impact on the measured ability of the
material so that a very short call is a good indication of whether the material is effective or not. Whilst the
Faraday Defense 3mm performed the worst of the 7, 4 other materials let through at least one of the calls.
Surprisingly, tin foil performed equally to the best Faraday Bag with no calls getting through to the device. The
next communication technology tested is WiFi as this technology has potential communication distances of
several hundreds of metres. The results for the WiFi tests are shown in figure 2.

Figure 2. WiFi Call Failures
The 2.4GHz WiFi tests show that the most effective material is the EDEC Black Hole Faraday Bag with none of
the communication attempts able to penetrate the bag. The other materials let through at least 2 of the attempts
at communication with aluminium foil allowing as many attempts as several of the other scenarios. The final
communication technology tested is Bluetooth and the results for this experiment are shown in figure 3.
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Figure 3. Bluetooth Call Failures
For the Bluetooth tests, the distance between the devices has a noticeable impact on the effectiveness of the
materials and this can be expected with the very limited range of Bluetooth. The following tables 2 – 6 show the
results for the various phone models with the 5 Faraday bags. Ticks indicate that the signal has penetrated the
bag where a cross indicates a successful shielding of the signal.
Table 2: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Faraday Defence 0.3mm
3G/4G
Wi-Fi
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s
0s
30s 60s
    
 
Samsung Galaxy S3
x
        
Samsung Galaxy S5
        
Samsung Galaxy S7

     
 
Sony Xperia Z5
x
    
  
Apple iPhone 5
      n/a n/a n/a
Basic Phone

Table 3: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Faraday Defence 0.7mm
3G/4G
Wi-Fi
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s
0s
30s 60s
  
Samsung Galaxy S3
x
x
x
x
x
 x
  
Samsung Galaxy S5
x
x
x
  
Samsung Galaxy S7
x
x
x
x
x
Sony Xperia Z5
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
 x
 
 x
Apple iPhone 5
x
x
 n/a n/a n/a
 x
Basic Phone
x
x
x

90s 120s
 
 
 
 
 
n/a n/a

90s 120s
 
 
 
x
x
x
x
n/a n/a

Table 4: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for EDEC Faraday Bag
3G/4G
Wi-Fi
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s
0s
30s 60s 90s
Samsung Galaxy S3
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Samsung Galaxy S5
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Samsung Galaxy S7
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Sony Xperia Z5
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Apple iPhone 5
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Basic Phone
x
x
x
x
x
n/a n/a n/a n/a

120s
x
x
x
x
x
n/a
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Table 5: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Faraday Cage ESD Bag
3G/4G
Wi-Fi
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s
0s
30s 60s
    
  
Samsung Galaxy S3
        
Samsung Galaxy S5
   
Samsung Galaxy S7
x
x
x
x
x
 
Sony Xperia Z5
x
x
x
x
x
x
    
  
Apple iPhone 5
      n/a n/a n/a
Basic Phone

Table 6: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Blackout Faraday Shield
3G/4G
Wi-Fi
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s
0s
30s 60s
    
  
Samsung Galaxy S3

Samsung Galaxy S5
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
  
Samsung Galaxy S7
x
x
x
x
x
 x

Sony Xperia Z5
x
x
x
x
x
  x

Apple iPhone 5
x
x
x
x
      n/a n/a n/a
Basic Phone


90s 120s
 
 
 
 
 
n/a n/a

90s 120s
 
x
x
 
 
x
x
n/a n/a

Of particular interest in these results is that whilst only the EDEC Faraday bag is successful in all experiments,
other bags have varied success depending on the mobile phone make and model, which different models from
the same manufacturer providing different results. Tables 7 and 8 show the results for the aluminium foil and tin
can as a shielding material.
Table 7: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Aluminium Foil
3G/4G
Wi-Fi
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s
0s
30s 60s 90s 120s
Samsung Galaxy S3
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
   
Samsung Galaxy S5
x
x
x
x
x
x
Samsung Galaxy S7
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
    
Sony Xperia Z5
x
x
x
x
x
    
Apple iPhone 5
x
x
x
x
x
Basic Phone
x
x
x
x
x
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Samsung Galaxy S3
Samsung Galaxy S5
Samsung Galaxy S7
Sony Xperia Z5
Apple iPhone 5
Basic Phone

Table 8: 3G / 4G and WiFi results for Tin Box
3G/4G
Wi-Fi
0s 30s 60s 90s 120s
0s
30s 60s 90s 120s
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
    
x
x
x
x
x
    
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
    
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Table 7 indicates that aluminium foil can be utilised for 3G / 4G signal shielding and is successful at shielding
the Sony Xperia Z5 and Iphone 5 from WiFi signals. In contrast, the tin box will prevent signal penetration of
3G / 4G for the basic phone which is not equipped with WiFi and will shield against WiFi for the Samsung
Galaxy S5 and S7 only. These results clearly show that no one rule for shielding material can be applied in all
circumstances with all phones or all technologies.

CONCLUSION
The use of Faraday bags, and in exceptional circumstances other materials to prevent unwanted radio
communications with seized wireless devices is an accepted and vital addition to the forensic investigators
toolkit. Forensic evidence is only of evidentiary value if it is maintained in the state that it was seized in without
modification or alteration. The ready availability of Faraday bags at little cost would seem to allow investigators
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to cheaply equip themselves with Faraday bags in readiness for a mobile phone seizure. However, the results of
this research show that only one of the 5 tested bags consistently provided reliable protection from radio waves
penetrating the bag. This same bag provided radio wave blocking for all 3 tested communication technologies
and surprisingly aluminium foil was as reliable in all but blocking of WiFi signals. The other bags, even when
nested inside each other to provide greater protection failed to completely block the radio signals with selections
of phones but that only testing of the phones and materials provided a guide as to their effectiveness. It is not
sufficient to estimate the effectiveness based on how they perform with some phones and extrapoloate the results
to incorporate untested phones. The forensic investigator should be aware that not all bags are of equal reliability
and the choice of which bag to utilise from which manufacturer should be made after reviewing rigorous testing
procedures such as these to ascertain their effectiveness. Additionally, should a reliable bag not be available,
aluminium foil will serve as an emergency measure provided the WiFi on the device is disabled by the
investigator.
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Abstract
Remote Desktop Applications (RDA) such as Virtual Network Computing (VNC), Cisco WebEx, GoToMeeting
and LogMeIn have been adapted and utilised recently. This is because they facilitate tier-one support to
configure computers, networks and solve application-related issues from a remote location. The direct benefit
from the use of these applications, is the time (and therefore cost) saving for organisations. Unfortunately,
“remoting” technology can also be used by criminals to perform illegal activities, hence remote applications are
of key interest to law agencies and forensic investigators. The research outlined in this paper aims to identify
any artefacts left behind by common remote applications and technologies used by many firms. These artefacts
can be vital to government law enforcement agencies and forensic investigators, as they could be used as
evidence in cyber-crime investigations. This research will focus on RealVNC, TightVNC, Cisco WebEx,
GoToMeeting and LogMeIn applications. The findings from the research shows some artefacts left behind by the
applications, which can be used by forensics investigators or law enforcement for possible evidence.
Keywords
Virtual Network Computing, Computer Forensics, Encryption, Computer Security, Remote Desktop

INTRODUCTION
RDA allow organisations and individuals to access a computer or network remotely, where physical access to
the network is not available or where access to the device is impractical. Such applications facilitate access to
computers as though a user is sitting right in front of his/her computer. There are various types of RDA currently
used by many organisations and individuals such as VNC, LogMeIn, Citrix GoToMyPc, LogMeIn and
TeamViewer. The increasing adoption and use RDA has also increased the potential for cyber threats to be
realised against organisations
However, using the application can be slow over the internet depending on the Internet connection speeds. Some
remote applications such as VNC have had security issues in past due to using weaker encryption
implementations (Kerai, 2010). It is plausible that similar issues exist in other remote applications, or still exist
in VNC.
In this paper, we detect and retrieve any artefacts left behind by RDA on a Windows computer. Client software
for five common remote applications (RealVNC, TightVNC, LogMeIn, Teamviewer and Citrix GoToMyPc) will
be installed individually on a Windows 10 computer, and test remote connections will be initiated that we expect
will create configuration changes on the computer. The information will be forensically analysed to find any
artefacts left by the application on the computer. The paper outlines the location of the artefacts and the types of
information left by the application.
RealVNC, TightVNC, LogMeIn, Teamviewer and Citrix GoToMyPc remote applications was used for to
conduct the research. The findings will show whether the R leave any artefacts, and this can help law
enforcements for forensic investigations.

BACKGROUND
Computer forensics is computer science used to aid legal process in investigations (Brown, 2006). It is the
process of obtaining, identifying, extracting, analysing and documenting digital evidence for use as evidence in
legal case (Brown, 2006; Kerai, 2010). However, forensics analysis need to be followed in a defined procedure
which is accept by the law court. A guideline defined in HB171 (HB171, 2003) is currently used as a guide to
carry out forensics investigations and manage electronic evidence.
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It is important to follow a standard procedure when performing acquisition of electronic evidence when
performing a forensic investigation (Hannay, 2008). It is important to acquire the evidence without modifying or
damaging it and validating the evidence is the same as original. This is done by chain of custody and
documentation.
Forensic analysis for remote protocols has been an area of interest for the law enforcements and other
government and state agencies. This is because these applications can be used to also perform cyber-crimes and
illegal communications. A previous research done by (Kerai, 2010), showed that VNC and Microsoft Remote
Desktop Protocol left behind artefacts, connection and application logs on a computer system locally. The
research showed that the VNC application and Remote Desktop Protocol leaves some artefacts on the Windows
Registry File System and other also connection and other application logs on the computer system locally.

REMOTE DESKTOP APPLICATIONS
Demand for RDA has increased with time, where a user can remotely connect, manage and configure another
computer or networks. Connectivity between a user’s computer to another remote computer can be achieved
with readily available hardware and software to connect you virtually to any remote network. The constraint is
cost and bandwidth issue that is associated with some technologies (Hoogenboom & Steemers, 2000).
There are various remote desktop applications and technologies available in recent years that can be used to
remote in and fix a computer related issues. Online tools like LogMeIn and Citrix GoToMyPc are easy to use,
reliable and secure (TeamViewer, 2016). However, standalone applications such as RealVNC, TightVNC,
UltraVNC, Teamviewer and others are applications will require the user to configure the application on the
computer for a remote connection, which may require some technical skills.
VNC (Virtual Network Computing) - VNC was first developed by the Olivetti and Oracle Laboratory as their
telephony system. Later the technology was acquired by AT&T labs and the owners of the technology formed
RealVNC to continue working with the remote technology.
The VNC application uses a Remote Frame Buffer protocol to remote access a graphical user interface of the
connected device. The application uses TCP 5900 and TCP 5800 for web based remote access. Hence it enables
users and organisation to access network resources remotely over the internet. The application has two
independent versions, the client and the server, both versions run on most operating system platforms. This
makes it very popular as anyone using Windows operating system can remote in to a Linux-based computer or
Mac OSX based computer and vice versa. However, a server instance needs to be installed on a computer and a
client is then used to access the server. Previous research has shown and discussed the results on how the VNC
connection works and the security features and weakness it has (Kerai, 2010).
Other remote support applications such as LogMeIn, GoToMyPc and Teamviewer use TCP port 443 and have
different application architecture and implementation than VNC application, due to them being web client based
rather than standalone. Hence the artefacts might be different compared to VNC application.
Next session outlines the lab setup and materials used to analyse the remote applications. The research outlines
artefacts left by the applications and individual or remote connection information. These artefacts and
information can be used by forensics investigators and law agencies in court of law as evidence, in a cyber-crime
related criminal case.
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EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Various software and tools were used during the data collection, acquisition and analysis of the raw dd image of
the Windows operating systems (see table 1). Different virtual machines and images were used to analyse the
application independently.
Table 1: Tools used in Experiments
Applications
VMware Workstation v12
professional
Remote Desktop Applications

Password Recovery Tools

Windows File System Tools

Windows 10 operating system was installed and created separate instances of
each application for analysis.
 Real VNC version 5.3.2


TightVNC version 2.7.10



Citrix GoToMyPC



Teamviewer



LogMeIn



Abel and Cain v 4.9.35 – This is a password recovery and sniffing
tool used to capture network traffic and sniff passwords.



VNCPass



VNCSniff



Microsoft Sysinternal Suite

ANALYSIS
All RDA were independently analysed on a virtual machine running the Windows 10 operating system. An
ADSL router by default does not have remote connections to computers externally, this is because the router
does not have remote protocol ports open on the router firewall. For VNC connection to work the user needs to
open TCP port 5900 and TCP port 5800 for the Java client. However other mentioned remote applications run on
TCP port 443, therefore they do not need special ports opened on the router. Once a VNC application is installed
on a computer it automatically opens the ports on the local Windows firewall.
VNC applications use Data Encryption Standard (DES)which has proven to be insecure due to its small key size
(56-bit). Due the weak encryption algorithm, an attacker can sniff the traffic after cracking the encrypted
password.
Windows Registry Analysis
The Windows registry is a central hierarchical database used by the Windows Operating System, to store all the
information that is necessary to configure and manage applications and hardware devices installed on the system
(MicrosoftSupport, 2016). The registry hive is a group of root keys and sub keys that contain application data
(Alghafli, Jones, & Martin, 2010). There are five logical hives in the Windows Registry, the application registry
values are most stored under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE and HKEY_USERS
registry hives.
RealVNC
RealVNC configuration is stored in the Windows registry, including encrypted login passwords, settins and
outbound connections made to the RealVNC servers. The default Windows registry viewer was used to analyse
the data and artefacts of the application. The connection server password used by the RealVNC server is
encrypted with DES encryption, since DES encryption is weak, the password can be retrieved easily. Tools such
as Cain and Abel, VNC Crack and online password cracking web services can crack DES encryption with no
cost, due to readily available tool to decrypt the encryption. Table 2 shows the artefacts left by RealVNC
application on Windows 10 machine.
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Table 2: RealVNC Windows Registry Analysis
Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncviewer\MRU, the application
stores all the history of the external IP addresses connections made to an external VNC
server.
Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncserver, the application
stores encrypted password of the RealVNC server. The password is encrypted with DES
encryption standard. Since DES is a weak encryption standard, decrypting the password is
possible.
Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\vncserver, the application also
stores configuration settings such as, if the application is personal or enterprise edition, RSA
private key and the authentication scheme used.

Under the HKEY_USERS\Software\RealVNC\vncserver, the application stores the vncserver
license key.

Table 3: RealVNC Logs on Windows File System


The application leaves log information in the Windows Event Viewer under the Application Logs. The
logs show client IP address that made the connection to the RealVNC server, and the connection logs
for the computer made a connection to another VNC server.



The RealVNC application stores the connections and application log settings on the hard drive. The log
file includes all the connection details, including the client IP address and any files transferred during
the connection. The file is located under C:\Program Files\RealVNC\VNC Server\Logs or C:\Program
Files (x86) \RealVNC\VNC Server\Logs.
However, by default the application logging is not enabled, therefore a user will need to enable logging
for the logs to be generated.



By default, Windows Firewall logs are not enabled, therefore no log information is kept if a VNC
connection is made inbound or outbound. However, if the Windows firewall logging is enabled, then
the VNC connection is logged on the log file. The firewall log file is located under
C:/Windows/System32/LogFiles/Firewall



The application stores the chat conversation logs under the folder
C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\RealVNC.

TightVNC
TightVNC is a free application, and works the same way as RealVNC. The application also stores the
application settings and logging information on both the Windows Registry structure and locally on the
computer hard drive. The connection server password used by the TIghtVNC server is encrypted with DES
encryption, in a similar way to how RealVNC server encrypts its password. As stated early the encryption is
weak and can be defeated easily to retrieve the server password. The table below shows the artefacts left by
RealVNC application on Windows 10 machine.

45



Table 4: TightVNC Windows Registry Analysis
Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server, the application stores the
configuration settings for the TightVNC server, this includes also the encrypted password for the
server. This password is used to connect to the server.



Just like RealVNC the connection password is encrypted with DES and therefore password can be
attacked with password cracking tools.



Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Viewer, the application stores all the
connection history of the local computer making VNC connections outbound. Therefore, the registry
key stores all the IP addresses the TightVNC server has made connection to another external VNC
server.



Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server, the application also stores the
configuration settings for the TightVNC server, this includes also the encrypted password for the
server. This password is used to connect to the server.

Table 5: TightVNC Logs on Windows File System


The application leaves log information in the Windows Event Viewer under the Application Logs. The
logs show client IP address that made the connection to the TightVNC server, and the connection logs
for the computer made a connection to another VNC server.



The application stores the connections and application log settings on the hard drive. The log file
includes all the connection details, including the client IP address and any files transferred during the
connection. The file is located under C:\ProgramData\TightVNC\ Server\Logs.
However, by default the application logging is not enabled, therefore a user will need to enable logging
for the logs to be generated.



Also, the application does not log any outgoing VNC connections, therefore if a user makes a VNC
connection to an external VNC server, no logging information is kept by the application.



By default, Windows Firewall logs are not enabled, therefore no log information is kept if a VNC
connection is made inbound or outbound. However, if the Windows firewall logging is enabled, then
the VNC connection is logged on the log file. The firewall log file is located under
C:/Windows/System32/LogFiles/Firewall

Citrix GoToMyPc
Citrix GoToMyPc is an application that can be used to access remote computers over internet connection. Unlike
VNC applications, GoToMyPc application does not require client and server, allowing invitations to other users
to remotely access their computer. The connection is done over HTTPS 443 TCP port; therefore, it does not
require to have an independent port open on the firewall to work.
The user initially will need to register on the Citrix GoToMyPc website and add remote computers to the
registered account. However, the remote computers need to have a GoToMyPc installation to receive the remote
connections. User will need to log in to the account and then initiate a remote connection by selecting the
computer defined on the user account. Someone can also send out an invite to connect a computer that is not
registered to the account and initiate a connection if accepted by the guest user. The application uses end to end
encryption during the remote connection using the AES 128bit encryption standards (GoToMyPc, 2016). The
table below shows the artefacts left by RealVNC application on a Windows 10 machine.
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Table 6: GoToMyPc Windows Registry Analysis


Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\Citrix\GoToMyPc, the application stores all the
configuration settings. The settings include encrypted access code with Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) 128-bit encryption standard, email address of the person the account is registered under and
other various settings.



The application also keeps are the records of guest invites send to connect to the GoToMyPc
workstation. These settings can be located under
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\Citrix\GoToMyPc\GuestInvite.



Under the registry value
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Citrix\GoToMyPc\FileTransfer\history and
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-97110503-761733263-37478255321001\SOFTWARE\Citrix\GoToMyPc\FileTransfer\history, the application stores the hostname of the
computer made the remote connection, including the location of any files transferred during the remote
session process.

Citrix GoToMyPc application did not log any access or connection logs on the local computer. The application
instead stores the connection logs on the user’s GoToMyPc online account. Hence no logs were available on the
local computer of any type of connections made or received. Also, no connection or applications logs were
stored on the Windows Event Viewer logs.
Teamviewer
Teamviewer is an organisation founded in 2005 in Germany that provides web based collaboration solutions and
remote desktop capable support to the users. The application can be used by users to remotely control another
computer that has the application installed on it. The application works over TCP port 443 and uses RSA
public/private key exchange and AES 256-bit session encryption to secure the connection traffic (TeamViewer,
2016). The table below outlines artefacts left behind by the application on the Windows Registry File Structure.
Table 7: Teamviewer Windows Registry Analysis


Under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Teamviewer; registry key value, it stores the
application settings including the account name of the Teamviewer account. This is the email address
used to login on to the Teamviewer account. The application also stores the username of the local
computer.



Under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\WOW6432Node\TeamViewer and HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-2197110503-761733263-3747825532-1001\SOFTWARE\Teamviewer; registry values, the application
stores the all the encryption keys and certificates that is generated, when a remote connection is
initiated and other Teamviewer settings.

Table 8: Teamviewer Logs on Windows File System


The application stores the incoming connection logs under the C:\Program Files (x86)
\TeamViewer\Connections_incoming, the file includes all the incoming connections to the computer.
However, Teamviewer doesnot use an IP address or email address for initiating a remote connection,
instead it uses a unique random generate number, which is used as a ID to initiate a connection.



Under the same folder C:\Program Files (x86) \TeamViewer\, Teamviewer stores a log file named
“TeamViewer11_Logile”, this file contains all the remote connection information, including the client
ID, the public IP address of the client that made the connection, log entries for any files transferred
during the remote session. This is crucial for the forensic investigation as it can be used to track down
an individual with a Public IP address.

The application stored no connection or applications logs were stored on the Windows Event Viewer logs.
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LOGMEIN
LogMeIn provides remote connectivity solutions to organisation for collaboration and IT management. The
organisation was found in 2003 and provides servers to user to access and connect to remote computers. The
LogMeIn client initially establishes a connection to LogMeIn servers and authenticates itself with a TLS1.X
certificate. Once the identity is verified the user can then connect to and exchange data to another host to
computer associated to the LogMeIn account. The application uses TLS based certificate authentication and uses
AES or Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption 128-bit or 256-bit encryption standards (LogMeIn,
2016). The table below outlines artefacts left behind by the application on the Windows Registry File Structure.
Table 9: LogMeIn Windows Registry Analysis


Under the registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\Toolkit\DesktopSharing,
the application stores the last guest recipient email address used to invite a user to remote into the
computer.



Under the registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\Toolkit\Filesharing, the
application last guest recipient email address used to share a file transfer from the computer.



Under the registry key, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn, the application stores all
the configuration settings and user preferences. The registry value also stores user guest invite settings.



Under the registry key, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\LogMeIn\V5\WebSvc\Shared, the
application stores details about any files shared to the remote user.

Table 10: LogMeIn Logs on Windows File System


LogMeIn application logs all the connection logs both incoming and outgoing to a log files located
under the C:\ProgramData\LogMeIn folder. There are two logs files that contain connection settings
including the public IP address of the remote user and basic remote connection settings used for the
connection.



The log files also contain information about file transfers and send over to remote computer, such as
name of the file, location of the file and file type.



The logs also contain details any incoming remote connections initiated to the computer by an external
remote user. This includes the public IP address of the computer initiating the remote connection.



The application incoming and outgoing remote connection is stored and captured on the Windows
event viewer, under the Application logs. The log entry stores public IP address of the guest user
connecting to the computer.



Once the remote user ends the connection or logged out, another log entry is created capturing the
event with the IP address and the time stamp of the connection.

As identified above on the results, the RDA do leave behind useful artefacts such as IP addresses and email
addresses of individuals who have remoted in a computer. This information can be used by law agencies and
forensic investigators to prosecute or assist them to develop their investigations further. The application
incoming and outgoing remote connection is stored and captured on the Windows event viewer, under the
Application logs. The log entry stores public IP address of the guest user connecting to the computer. The logs
also show information such as file name, type and location of files been transferred to the remote computer. This
can be used to find exactly what the kind of files were transferred and the location of the file on the local and
remote computer. All the applications store some sort of encrypted credentials and certificates on Windows
registry hive. However, VNC applications store server connection password on DES encryption standard, a less
secure and can be cracked easily by password cracking tools.
Comparing the results of previous research done by (Kerai, 2010), there is not a much difference on how RDA
leave behind artefacts. Especially RealVNC and TightVNC applications do leave behind reasonable number of
artefacts including the connection encrypted password used by the applications
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CONCLUSION
Remote desktop applications provide end users and organisations the ability to remote in to networks and
computers to manage and troubleshooting network related issues. Due to its ease and graphical interface, the
adoption of remote access application is rapidly increasing. There are benefits of RDA to organisations and
individuals, however the technology can also be exploited by criminals, cyber groups and terrorist groups to
perform illegal activities on remote computers and networks.
As shown above, several RDA leave behind local artefacts which can be of importance to forensic investigation.
This is a large impact to government law enforcements agencies and forensics investigators to recover any
potential artefacts left behind by the applications on the computer for further investigations. The artefacts can be
used to investigate crimes committed by individuals who have transferred explicit, illegal and terrorism relates
materials and documents over the remote connection.
The research conducted has verified that the remote applications do leave artefacts behind and can be assessed
and reviewed in forensically sound manner. Further research will explore and compare other remote
applications, along with evaluating the applications use on different operating systems. Providing further
important artefacts that can be of a forensic interest.
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Abstract
The Pacific Islands are seriously challenged by the growth in wealth and the expansion of international material
possessions. On the roads traffic has grown dramatically and the types of vehicles now using Island roads has
greatly changed. With the importation of cheap second hand vehicles designed for freeway speeds serious safety
issues have grown proportionally with the increasing numbers. In this research we consider the prohibitive costs
of traditional traffic controls to economy and propose a light weight highly mobile aerial surveillance system
that integrates with ground policing capability. Our research question was: How can road safety and security be
enhanced with economical technologies? In addition to collecting and processing live data we have also
designed a forensically ready system, and an information system to process the large amounts of data generated
by the addition of these technologies into the traffic surveillance processes.
Keywords
Surveillance, Security, Road Safety, Economical Technology, Innovation

INTRODUCTION
Aerial surveillance has a long history of use in the military for monitoring activities on the ground
(CambraBascca et al., 2013). Commercially, aerial surveillance is used for monitoring resources such as forests,
crops, coast lines, aerial news gathering, and search and rescue. The surveillance activities have relied initially
on the human eye and binoculars but now have moved towards sophisticated cameras and digital technologies.
These images can be reviewed in real time or can be examined at a later date for forensic analysis and evidence.
With regards to traffic surveillance in particular, the increase in the number of vehicles on road has led transport
management agencies to seek the use of advanced technologies that can provide better information more cheaply
in order to service informed decisions and road safety. This requires collection of precise and accurate
information about the state of traffic, conformance, behaviours and road conditions. It is also required to get
timely information in case of emergencies (accidents, and so on). In the case of accidents, the time of response is
critical in victim survivability and with increased traffic volumes even emergency vehicles struggle to reach
incident scenes in a timely fashion. Traditional surveillance methods do not prove to be time effective or cost
effective. They can provide useful information about traffic flows but cannot provide useful information
regarding traffic flows over a space of time including the vehicle trajectories, routing information and real-time
movements (Cheng et al., 2012).
Traffic information is the foundation of traffic management, traffic control, and transportation planning.
However, many rural and some urban road segments are not installed with any fixed traffic detectors due to the
high cost and historically low volumes. In addition in many of the built-up city areas with high surveillance the
motorists have learnt behaviour regarding fixed cameras and mobile vehicles, and have change their behaviour to
only comply when a surveillance instrument is present. This is exactly why my research is aiming to see if the
using of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) will be effective in the Kingdom of Tonga for improving
the flow of information for the control of vehicle traffic. Additionally, mobile traffic sensors are not broadly
used, which leads to low traffic information acquisition. As a new tool, UAV or civil drone has its unique
advantages of flexibility and mobility, wide view scope, and low cost compared with traditional fixed systems.
Hence, in this work, UAVs are introduced to monitor road segments and to identify the problems and challenges
that would face a full implementation. At present UAVs have many limitations that require management. Some
of the challenges are battery life, attenuation of signals, camera cost, large datasets, lack of training, and other
issues that will be documented in this research.
This paper is structured to review the background context, look at visual data processing, consider the big data
problem, and to propose an integrated visual surveillance system for traffic management. The research
contribution is the problem evaluation and design solution proposed.
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PROBLEM BACKGROUND
Tonga has very small islands with over one hundred thousand people in population. Consequently small
lightweight UAVs even with their current capabilities of endurance are effective tools for monitoring behaviours
on the road (Dijk et al., 2013). Tonga does not have any traffic lights even in the most populated areas and few
fixed surveillance cameras. There appears to be a need for some kind of electronic device that will assist the
Tonga Police in their traffic duties, that is economically effective and efficient. The objectives for this research
are to match the suitability of current off-the-shelf drones under $5000 to the task of traffic surveillance (Cusack
& Khaleghparast, 2005); and, then to propose the design for information management system. There are also
other practical questions to be considered. For example, Are the weather conditions in Tonga suitable? What
about from January to April in the hurricane season? Also there is the consideration of other applications of these
lightweight surveillance devices. For example, are they useful for other needs such as searching, Agriculture,
Fisheries, Fire department or any other commercial need. These are very important areas in Tonga also. The
question is, are we able to adopt some kind of framework that will help our traffic conformance as well as the
other needs using the civil drones? Because the most important issue here is the safety of the people and if the
civil drone can economically add value they should be more widely used.
Traffic conformance audit on roads is maintained by a mixture of surveillance devices and techniques (Coifman
et al., 2004; Goradia & Xi, 2012). A compliant vehicle is one which delivers the transportation service within a
profile of measurable attributes that conform to the usage contract. These attributes include behaviour, speed,
mechanical safety, registration, licensing and so on. The usage contract has a wide variety of requirements that
cover different vehicles, human factors and situations. Traffic intelligence can be gathered from a wide range of
sensor networks. The most important aspect of using this intelligence is reference. References are found when
for example the speed of the vehicle is compared with the conformance contract. A bus or a truck for example
has a different conformance contract than a motorcar. Similarly matters of weight, size, registration, and so on
all fall within the spectrum of traffic surveillance and intelligence gathering. Each instance on the road has a
different conformance contract and some contracts overlap. The overall result is that any data which is collected
has to be assessed against the reference data or template. Consequently the information processing around sensor
networks has to be tuned to automate the lower-level decision-making processes and to filter out compliant
information (Kastrinaki et al., 2003; Ahmed et al., 2012). Persons deciding how to act require only selective
information that is about variations to conformance.
When the information processing processes are automated information may be fed directly to law enforcement
or an investigating officer. For example sensors on roads may indicate that a vehicle is overweight or over height
or travelling with excessive speed or dangerously (Bakhtari et al., 2006; Amran et al., 2014). For this to happen
the primary data has to be processed in such a way that the information provided for decision-makers is
summative in nature and represents previous determinations against benchmarks. To achieve this level of
sophistication highly intelligent information systems are required to support a sensor network. This would mean
that when adding UAVs to a surveillance network that the extra intelligence data can be processed into useful
information for the decision-makers effectively and efficiently. The software and the computational algorithms
required have to be built into the information system to support the higher-level decision-making capability. In
practical terms this means that a match between an image of a vehicle and a database is required in order to find
information such as the current warrant fitness, the current owner and other useful information that can lead to
those responsible for the conformance contract.

VISUAL DATA COLLECTION
A quad-copter drone was used to take video footages of vehicles travelling over city streets. These video
footages were then used as the input of the data processing life cycle that was used to automatically process
number plates and speed data. The data could be processed either on the drone motherboard, stored for later
analysis or in our case we beamed directly back in real time to a laptop processing unit. We calculated vehicle
speed and number plate recognition using the following processes.
Generally, a license plate detection system has to solve two problems: where a license plate is located and how
big it is (Howell, 2015). Usually, the candidate position of characters in the license plate is first identified, and
the bounding box of the license plate is determined later. There are many challenges in license plate detection in
an open environment, such as various observation angles from cameras, background clutter, differently sized
license plates, poor image quality from uneven lighting conditions, and multi-plate detection. In terms of drone
traffic surveillance in Tonga, the increase in the number of road users today has led to evaluating the use of
technologies for monitoring and control. However, the environment posed extra challenges for instance, the
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existence of tree branches over public roads, low overhead phone and power lines and tall coconut trees near
roads. These can be major obstruction as they block the drone’s view and hide vital evidence.
The Quad-copter that was used to take images for data collection purpose in this study used ISO-100, shutter
6400, EV-1 and Fnum-F2.8 camera settings. Figure 1 specifies the steps in image processing that we used. Step
one deals with image acquisition, two deals with pre-processing processes which concerns with ways that
increases the chances for success. Step three deals with partitioning of the image into parts or objects and step
four concerns with the conversion of the input data into a form that is suitable for computer processing. Step five
deals with the description of the image. This is concerning the extraction of the features that can be used to
differentiate one object from the other. Step six deals with recognition of the image, assigning a label to an
object based on its descriptors. Final step is concerned with the interpretation of the image to assign meaning to
the recognised objects. We developed this model in the research and applied it to the actual processing of
numberplates. The number plate processing required morphological processes, a conversion of the colour
imagery from the drone camera to greyscale is, and then a cropping and a dilation of the image so that only the
number plate could be fed through the character recognition algorithm. With the limited number (6) of characters
on a number plate processing was very quick. When the system is connected to a reference database then
immediate data match can be achieved to find the owner of the conformance contract.
The speak calculations could proceed in two fashions. The simplest way is to take time elapses as vehicles move
between measured points. However the resultant is an average speed and the distance between the markers has to
be sufficient that the entry image and exit image are distinct, and that the margins for visual error calculations
are also factored. Consequently we opted for pixel by pixel image processing to calculate instantaneous speeds.
Drone traffic surveillance provides many advantages for instance; low cost, easy to deploy, high mobility, large
view scope, uniform scale, and so on (Goradia & Xi, 2012; The Economist, 2015). The drone can adjust its
flying altitude in order to capture the target object from various angles in order to have the best image. However,
data captured by drones contains much more complex information than traditional surveillance video. Footages
captured by drone contain not only the traditional data such as traffic flow information but also 360 o level data
for each vehicle such as vehicle's trajectory data, lane change data and the cars around data on the road. As a
result, extracting a moving object from video frames is a challenge.
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Figure 1: Four phases of image processing employed in this study.
Each vehicle’s speed includes two directions – longitudinal and lateral. Usually the lateral value can be assumed
to be 0 unless the vehicle makes a lane change. If that happens, the value will change accordingly but relatively
small compared to the longitudinal speed. In terms of footage from the drone, any movements in the lateral
direction can be the drone’s camera motion. In order to minimize this type of errors, only the velocity of vehicle
along the road longitudinal direction is considered, which can be expressed by

It is possible to acquire each pixel’s velocity however, due to the variability nature of the optical flow at pixel
level; the accuracy of the vehicle’s speed obtained is questionable. As a result, the optical flow is used to detect
the shape of each vehicle, and the value of
is converted into a binary value in the following equation where
τ and σ are the maximum and minimum rational speeds.
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This relates to the drone’s altitude and its stability when the image is captured.

Figure 2: speed calculation images
Drones have proven to be beneficial, effective and efficient in observing and surveilling activities on the ground
(Kovar, 2015; Paganini, 2015). However, calculating speed of moving vehicles from a moving camera such as
those on drones in real-time is a difficult task due to the potential variability in moving frames, movement and
vibration of the drone’s camera in the air caused by wind force, the vehicle will change its position on the video
as it is travelling so the angle will change accordingly. The settings of the drone’s camera might also change
such as its brightness values and colours. As a result, stationary and moving cameras call for different processing
approaches. In our research we produce the computational algorithms for both instances but only did the
calculations and practice for a stable drone. Hence, when the image from the drone’s footage is acquired, the
point of interest is characterised by its vector features composed of 128 values. The feature matching process
started continuously in order to detect changing similarity points and to filter the most stable estimate. The
filtering process delivers two images of the vehicle that are very close in time, and hence the distance covered by
each image object can be simply computed.

BIG DATA PROBLEMS
The current technologies used for traffic surveillance seem to be inadequate, inasmuch as, purposely placed
cameras can only photograph speeding vehicles or vehicles proceeding through red lights. Such images cannot
give investigators information such as behaviour of the driver that leads to a traffic accident. For instance, were
they weaving all over the road even though they were driving slowly? This type of question needs a different
type of monitoring system. However, although there are many benefits of such system, the main challenge is
managing big data issues (Rowlingson, 2004; Pooe et al., 2012). The small digital cameras are very efficient and
they produce huge amounts of image and other metric data. Big data is a term used to describe sets of electronic
data both structured and unstructured, that are large and complex. The current data processing techniques or
methods, database applications and software are insufficient. The main issues of big data include capturing,
searching, storage, analysis, query and updating and managing information privacy just to name a few. If this is
the case then the question is, how big is big data? An example of big data might be Petabytes (1,024 terabytes)
or Exabyte (1,024 petabytes) of data consisting of billions to trillions of records. From the data that was
collected for this study, a 60 seconds of footage from the quad-copter equals to 446.25MB of video data, this
was taken with ISO-100, shutter 6400, EV-1 and Fnum-F2.8 at 25 frames per second, a rate of 60Mbps. At this
rate, a drone that can take 30 minutes of video, that is 446.25 x 30 = 13 Gigabytes and 387.5 Megabytes of data.
This amount of data will multiply by the number of hours worked each day, and by the number of drones being
used by the police department. In terms of storage, if the traffic surveillance system in Tonga employs five quadcopters, video footage streaming from five drones will be 133 Gigabytes and 875 Megabytes of data. Even for
small to medium amounts of data the speed of extraction and access to specific segments of data can be hard to
manage when the volumes get great. If the traffic surveillance system in Tonga employed five quad-copters, and
they observe traffic behaviours every day but only at peak hours, 3 hours in the morning and 3 hours in the
evening. Capturing six hours a day of streaming video data from five drones, that’s 823 Gigabytes 250
Megabytes of video data. If 823,250 is multiplied by 365 days, that’s over 293 Terabytes of data in one year.
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A FORENSICALLY READY DRONE INFORMATION SYSTEM
The notion of digital forensic readiness is to meet the objectives for a system that is used in a digital
investigation to maximise its ability to collect reliable evidence while minimising the cost (Beebe et al., 2005;
Paganini, 2014). The forensic readiness objectives are designed to:
a) To gather admissible evidence legally and without interfering with business processes.
b) To gather evidence targeting the potential crimes and disputes that may adversely impact an
organisation.
c) To allow an investigation to proceed at a cost in proportion to the incident.
d) To minimise interruption to the business from any investigation.
e) To ensure that evidence makes a positive impact on the outcome of any legal action.
The advantages of forensic readiness planning include:
Preparing for potential need for digital evidence. If an organisation has to go to litigation and if digital
evidence is required, electronic evidence is required to be collected and stored in an appropriate manner so
that it is readily available when requested and can be admissible in the court of law. In this process, incident
response, disaster recovery and business continuity policies are improved by a forensic readiness policy or
plan.
Minimising the cost of the investigation. In the case of a drone surveillance system, the evidence is already
gathered, the investigator needs only to process, analyse and review the video footages. This enables faster
and more efficient investigation process as a result, the cost of the investigation is minimised and interruption
to businesses’ normal operation is also minimised. Figure 3 illustrates the systems process architecture.
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Figure 3: A forensic readiness processes for drone traffic surveillance information system
The requirement to process big data from a drone surveillance program for traffic conformance can be mitigated
by an efficient and effective information systems architecture. We propose a structure that is supported by both
technology and personnel that can efficiently and effectively mine the mountain of data delivered by both
exception and by archival extraction. Real-time data is most efficiently processed by exception filters and this
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data can be rapidly transmitted to enforcement officers for further follow-up. Stored data requires both storage
and mining capabilities. We propose in figure 4 an information systems architecture that maps operational and
infrastructure readiness onto the response units liable to act on the information. The information itself has been
categorised before extraction and prepared by due processes that are compliant by law and by policy for its
usage. Such a system is a necessary addition to any new technologies that may be used for traffic control and
conformance.
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Figure 4: Information Systems architecture for drone data

CONCLUSION
The study was aimed to fill the identified gap in the literature and in practice by developing an information
system that is forensically ready to use for drone traffic surveillance in Tonga. The relatively small size of each
island and the intensity of traffic allowed lightweight and economical quad copters to be used in this research.
The proposal is innovative and as a prototype has added value to current traffic monitoring and control systems.
Further research is proposed into the efficient utilisation of the resource so that effective monitoring of vehicle
behaviour can be achieved within stringent economic constraints for data. The systems reviewed and shown in
this paper provide a cost-effective solution to the constraints imposed by the problem context.
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Abstract
The prevalence of remnant data in second hand storage media is well documented. Since 2004 there have been
ten separate papers released through Edith Cowan University alone. Despite numerous government agencies
providing advice on securing personal and corporate information, and news articles highlighting the need for
data security, the availability of personal and confidential data on second hand storage devices is continuing,
indicating a systemic laissez faire attitude to data security, even in our supposedly cyber security conscious
world. The research continues, but there seems to be a lack of correlation of these studies to identify trends or
common themes amongst the results. The fact that this type of research continues to be conducted highlights the
deficiencies in the methods used to advertise warnings publicised by Government departments and industry
experts. Major media organisations seem reluctant to broadcast these warnings, unless there is a bigger story
behind the issue. This paper highlights the ongoing issues and provides insight to the factors contributing to this
growing trend.
Keywords
Digital storage devices, remnant data, data recovery, privacy, data sanitisation.

INTRODUCTION
Remnant data on second hand devices has been a topic of research since 1996 (Gutmann, 1996). Over the last
10 years’ numerous research projects have been completed on this very topic, but to date there has been no
collective quantitative or statistical evaluation of all the results, to establish the existence of any trends or
common themes. Some research has been conducted in consecutive years by the same academics, e.g. through
Edith Cowan University in 2011, 2012 and 2013 (Szewczyk, Robins, & Sansurooah, 2013; Szewczyk &
Sansurooah, 2011; Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2012), and while these papers have compared the types and sizes of
the memory cards purchased, there was no quantitative or qualitative analysis of the data retrieved. Another
paper did make some comparisons with six years of research (Jones, Valli, Dardick, Sutherland, & Dabibi,
2009), but was limited to their own research.
Digital Storage
Large volume digital storage media is in great demand and the global market as a whole is predicted to reach
$6.2 billion by the year 2022 (ReportBuyer, 2015). Advances in computer technology have lead the world to
embrace the concept of big data, where more storage is required. Governments and businesses, have unique
storage requirements for daily activities and are turning towards the cloud to meet these growing needs.
Eventually as storage devices become obsolete and if still serviceable, will still have a monetary value.
2015 saw a decline of -9.2% in the worldwide personal and entry-level hard disk storage market (Li, 2016). This
highlights a possible need for the second hand market for the selling of cheap mechanical storage to meet the
needs of the home based user. A search for “used” hard disk drives on the popular online auction site eBay
yielded more than 33,000 listings. Other storage media types are not immune to this. New and used thumb drives
can differ in price by as much as 900% (eBay, 2016). This type of division of cost can be found across all the
different types of storage from flash memory to memory cards to solid state hard drives (SSD).
Performance, larger capacities and cost are the driving factors in the growth of flash storage focused
technologies (Bez & Pirovano, 2014). Flash storage technologies were predicted to increase in size during 2016
(Sliwa, 2016), this is corroborated by the announcement that Samsung will release a 32TB SSD in 2017 (Shah,
2016). However, while the cost of SSD Hard Drives remain high, the demand for traditional mechanical drives
will remain (Bez & Pirovano, 2014).
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Previous Research
Edith Cowan University (ECU) has hosted the Australian Digital Forensics Conference since 2006 (ECU, 2016),
where numerous papers from around the world that detail research into recovered remnant data on second hand
storage media have been presented. The following papers, some that where presented at the conference, and
others that were not, have been analysed in this study:
















I know what you did last summer… An Investigation into Remnant Data on USB Storage Devices Sold
in Australia in 2015 (Robins, Williams, & Sansurooah, 2015).
Information Security Leakage: A Forensic Analysis of USB Storage Disks (Adam & Clarke, 2014).
Analysis of Deletion Habits On Used USB Thumb Drives (Farden & Diesburg, 2014).
Sellers Continue to Give Away Confidential Information on Second Hand Memory Cards Sold in
Australia (Szewczyk et al., 2013a).
The 2012 Analysis of Information Remaining on Computer Hard Disks offered for Sale on the Second
Hand Market in the UAE (Jones, MArtin, & Alzaabi, 2012).
The 2012 Investigation into Remnant Data on Second Hand Memory Cards Sold in Australia
(Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2012b).
A 2011 investigation into remnant data on second hand memory cards sold in Australia (Szewczyk &
Sansurooah, 2011).
Data Remanence in New Zealand: 2011(Roberts & Wolfe, 2011).
The 2009 Analysis of Information Remaining on Disks Offered for Sale on the Second Hand Market
(Jones, Valli, Dardick, et al., 2009).
The 2009 Analysis of Information Remaining on USB Storage Devices Offered for Sale on the Second
Hand Market (Jones, Valli, & Dabibi, 2009).
The 2008 Australian study of remnant data contained on 2nd hand hard disks: the saga continues (Valli
& Woodward, 2008).
Who is Reading the Data on Your Old Computer (Mee, 2008).
An Evaluation of Personal Health Information Remnants in Second Hand Personal Computer Disk
Drives (Emam, Neri, & Jonker, 2007).
Oops they did it again: The 2007 Australian study of remnant data contained on 2nd hand hard disks
(Valli & Woodward, 2007).
An empirical methodology derived from the analysis of information remaining on second hand hard
disks (Fragkos, Mee, Xynos, & Angelopoulou, 2006).

Statistical Analysis
All of the research papers where reviewed and the data was collated. As shown in Figure 1 of the fifteen
research papers, eleven have resulted in data retrieval from more than half of the items purchased, with 40% of
the research resulting in data retrieval from over three quarters of the items purchased. It is interesting to note
that of all the research, 11 papers recorded attempts to sanitise devices, either by delete, format or repartitioning
the volumes. Of these research projects, seven (64%) recorded a sanitisation attempt rate of less than half of the
items purchased, and five (45%) are below one quarter.
The quantity of sensitive personal data recovered is also seen as significant (Figure 2), when you consider this as
potentially facilitating the means to engage in identity fraud. Corporate data did not fare any better and it is
concerning to note that there exist companies, including those in the ICT industry that do not have effective
sanitisation and disposal policies to protect their most valuable commodity – their data.
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Figure 1 Statistical analysis of 15 remnant data papers with the X axis shows the year, country and number of
items purchased

Figure 2 Statistical analysis of 15 remnant data papers with regards to sensitive data types

59

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Common Themes
All of the research papers detailed very similar outcomes in relation to the sensitive, personal and corporate
information that is more than sufficient for identity theft or industrial espionage. The majority of the research
papers offered some form of reasoning behind the continuing problem from organisations lacking adequate
policies, procedures and strategies that deal with the sanitisation of digital storage to the time consuming nature
of developing and implementing not just the strategies and policies but the education of employees.
One common theme across the research is the premise that sellers, both corporate and private do not have an
adequate understanding of how ‘delete’ and ‘format’ actually work, and have little understanding of how to
correctly sanitise their digital media. In 2015 Robins, Williams and Sansurooah postulated that conflicting and
misleading advice currently available on the Internet as one possible cause (Robins et al., 2015). However, the
fact remains that not enough is known by the general public on how to sanitise digital storage media. Figure 2
shows a steady decline in the amount of corporate data discovered over the 10 years surveyed. This is possibly
due to a greater understanding of the problems that exist, however, a number of the research papers show that
there are still companies that do not take action, as stated in the 2010 Jones, Valli, Dardick, Sutherland and
Dabibi paper.
Corporations spend vast amounts on the protection of data in transit and at rest, but when it comes to the storage
device, there seems to be a lax approach. Considering the remnant data that potentially exists, it is strange that
some sellers advertise the item for sale as coming from a corporate or government organisation. For those who
deal in industrial secrets, this type of hardware would be a goldmine. Take for instance data recovered from a
mining company in Australia during 2008. This project recovered supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) master plans and passwords, including the Administrator password, as well as photos of the mine site
and employees (Valli & Woodward, 2008). Or the data recovered in Australian during the 2015 research, that
included legal documents, contracts, agreements and offshore gas transportation documents marked “private and
confidential” (Robins et al., 2015). Some companies have taken steps to ensure sanitisation, but are relying on
third party organisations to complete the task. The risk here is the possibility that some work is substandard and
leaves remnant data behind.
The datatypes that are being recovered are consistent across the entire 10 years of surveyed research. The papers
detail the recovery of scanned images of passports, travel itineraries and boarding passes. PayPal and banking
data, including login credentials and scanned images of credit cards have been discovered in many of the
projects undertaken. Couple this with the ability to identify sellers from photographs recovered from devices and
you could have the potential for disastrous consequences to occur for the seller.
Overall a common theme is that all papers report their results to be consistent with similar studies in previous
years. The 2011 research completed in New Zealand found their results to be consistent with international
research dating back to 2005 (Roberts & Wolfe, 2011), and a 2008 Irish paper reported results consistent with
other worldwide research and showed that it was not only a problem in Ireland, but the rest of the world (Mee,
2008). Six years of research with similar results, this shows that education of the masses is either grossly
ineffective or non-existent.
Trends
The statistical analysis shows that overall the amount of data retrieved has increased significantly, even though
the percentage of data that is seen as ‘readily available’ has remained relatively static throughout the research
(Figure 1). Instances of attempts to sanitise devices has steadily increased, which could be part of lack of
knowledge on how ‘delete’ and ‘format’ work (this data includes successful sensitisations). An interesting trend
is the sharp reduction in the faulty items being sold, which was also reported in the 2009 United Kingdom
Australia paper (Jones, Valli, Dardick, et al., 2009).
The trends shown in Figure 2 is that the amount of retrievable data of a personal nature has been increasing
whilst corporate data is steadily decreasing. Organisations seem to be becoming more aware of implications and
risks associated with disposing of digital media. Eight research papers stated that documents relating to
Government organisations were located at some point in the analysis. The latest such find was in 2015 where
the construction plans for an Australian army barracks where located. This fact is surprising, when you consider
the requirements of the Australian Privacy Principles imposed on all Australian Government Departments from
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2013 (OAIC, 2013) and the advice published by the Australian Signals Directorate in their data sanitisation
guide (ASD, 2016b).
One trend shows a degree of laziness on the part of sellers, where they are requesting the buyer to remove their
data. In 2012 Australian research there were 19 instances where a note requesting the buyer to delete the contents
of the device was included with the product (Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2012). This trend continued in the 2013
Australian research, where a seller supplied a note reporting attempting to remove the data, but was unsure if it
was successful and some sellers advertising on the auction listing that devices where being “sold as is” and data
would not be deleted due to time constraints (Szewczyk et al., 2013a).
Each year that the research is conducted, the average storage size of the purchased second hand items has
increased, this is especially true for the thumb drives and flash memory. There are two possible answers to this,
one being that the cost per gigabyte is reducing and the other possibility is that users are requiring more storage
space. With the increase in storage capacity, there has been an increase in the amount of retrievable data (Jones,
Valli, Dardick, et al., 2009; Robins et al., 2015).
Search Engine Query – “How to delete data”
There is a significant quantity of remnant data being retrieved from second hand devices, and the Robins,
Williams and Sansurooah paper mentioned the conflicting and misleading advice on the Internet. As a result an
analysis of available information found on the Internet was undertaken for erasing data. The searches were
conducted using Google, Bing, Yahoo and Ask, the top four English language search engines (eBiz, 2016), and
the browser used was Firefox. The search term “how to erase data from a thumb drive” was used, with only the
first page of search results reviewed. To ensure a clinical response, a generic new user account was created for
each search engine used and no web accounts logged into.

Delete/Format
Wipe/Erase
Fill up and delete
Bad links
Advertisements

Table 1 – Search Engine Queries for Data Erasure
Google
Bing
Yahoo
6 Windows
5 Windows
5 Windows
1 Mac
1 Windows
1 Windows
2 Windows
1 Mac
1 Mac
2 Mac
1 Windows
1 Windows
1 Windows
2
5

ASK
4 Windows
3 Windows
2 Mac
1 Windows
10

Google
Ten results were returned. The first two results were YouTube videos on how to perform a quick format on a
flash drive. The video titles were:



“How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash Drive Tutorial” (Rivera, 2011)
“How to erase all content on USB Flashdrive” (Anthoct104, 2011)

Two links took the searcher to sites that detailed how to use the erase a thumb drive, one for the Apple OSX
operating system and the other for Microsoft Windows. The Windows environment the tools suggested where
Disk Wipe and CCleaner and MAC users where advised to open Disk Utilities and select “Erase”. One forum
site suggested the user fill the drive with junk, then delete the junk and repeat two more times. Of the remaining
six results, the sites the user was directed to varied from forum posts to blog style instructions on how to perform
a delete or format of the device. The interesting result is the descriptions used across the results, these ranged
from “how to format” to “how to clear” to “how to delete”.
Bing
Ten result were returned. The first two results were links to a web page and a YouTube video. The result titles
where:



“Deleting files in your flash drive or memory card using a PC” (SanDisk, 2008)
“How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash Drive Tutorial” (Rivera, 2011)
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While there was only one result returned for Apple OSX based computers, it also detailed the use of the OSX
Disk Utilities Erase function. Of the Windows based results, two where links that displayed content errors and
all of the others had titles that ranged from “permanently delete files” to “How to erase all content” to “How to
erase a flash drive”. After result number five, Bing displayed a link tilted “Videos of how to erase data from a
thumb drive”. It was observed that this link title related directly to the search criteria, and when opened, a large
number of videos where displayed, again with varying titles that contained the words erase, delete, wipe or
format.
Yahoo
Ten results were returned, along with 5 advertisements for products, reports and tips relating to wiping data from
a device. The first result was a link to a 2011 YouTube video on how to format a USB drive. The first link on
how to erase a device was for an Apple OSX at result number 3 and for a PC at result number 4. Result numbers
8 – 10 also described methods for erasing data, including filling the device up with junk and deleting. Yahoo
provides featured content labelled as “How to erase data from a thumb drive - Yahoo Answers results”. The
three items displayed had nothing to do with erasing data from a thumb drive.
ASK
Ten results – the first two results matched those of the searches completed using Google, these being:



“How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash Drive Tutorial” (Rivera, 2011)
“How to erase all content on USB Flashdrive” (Anthoct104, 2011)

10 advertisements where displayed, five above and below the web results with all advertisements at the top
repeated at the bottom. Two advertisements where for products that could erase storage media, however, three
advertisements where for the recovery of data. Unlike the previous search engines, Ask.com returned six of the
ten results as relating to the erasure of data, the first of these results being at number 4 on the page.
Combined Results
The search engines returned similar content, considering that the 2011 YouTube video is consistently within the
top two results across all platforms.

Result Title

Table 2- Common Search Engine Results for Data Erasure
Position in Results List

How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash drive Tutorial
How to erase all content on USB Flashdrive
Deleting files in your flash drive or memory card using a PC
how to clear data from a USB stick on a Mac
How to Completely Erase a Memory Stick
How to Delete the Files on a USB Flash Drive
Permanently delete files from a flash drive
USB - How do I format my USB Flash Drive on a Mac?
data leakage - How do I securely erase USB flash drives
How do I erase or wipe an old Flash Drive?
How can I securely erase files from a USB drive
How to Delete Everything on a USB Flash Drive

Google

Bing

Yahoo

Ask

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2
7
1

1

1
2
3

5

10
9

3
2
4
6
9
8
7
5

4
6
8
10
7
9
5

A large number of search results appear on at least two of the search engines (Table 2). The array of titles
suggests information about erasure of data, but unsuspecting users are supplied conflicting information. For
example, “How to Erase/Delete All Data from Flash drive Tutorial” is misleading, as the content is about how to
format a flash drive and this result is returned as the top option across all platforms. Of concern is that it was
posted in 2011 and this poses the question around how and why search engines return particular results.
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DISCUSSION
The world as we know it is in the grip of cybercrime epidemic, in 2015 Steve Morgan, writing for Forbes, stated
“Cyber-attacks are costing businesses $400 - $500 billion per year” (Morgan, 2015). In 2016 ABC News
reported that Cybercriminals are increasingly targeting Australian consumers (Taha, 2016). The threat of
identity theft is real, and this research indicates that people, corporations and governments are taking minimal or
no precautions to protect their most valuable asset – their sensitive and identifying data. The research projects
analysed shows instances of recovering data that could result in the theft of an identity. The result also showed
that while the amount of sensitive corporate data recovered is decreasing, it is still being recovered. Consumers
are constantly told how an organisation was hacked or succumbed to an attack, and the incidents of identity theft
through the theft of hardcopy mail (Edwards, 2015). But there seems to be very little heard on the discovery of
information that can be of value to the identity thief through the recovery of remnant data.
The Australian Signals Directorate has posted information on how to protect data from being divulged (ASD,
2016b), but this document and the subsequent information is difficult to locate. In the 2013 Australian research
project it was reported that eBay no longer provide warnings to sellers on the sanitisation of data from storage
devices put up for sale (Szewczyk, Robins, & Sansurooah, 2013). These warnings where reported as being
provided by eBay in the 2011 Australian paper (Szewczyk & Sansurooah, 2011). This may indicate a
complacency exhibited in the attitudes of the sellers. Indeed, some private organisations have conducted their
own research into remnant data. Avast antivirus company detailed the purchase of 20 used smartphones from
eBay and the personal data that was recovered from these devices (Hořejší, 2014). Corporate and government
cloud users have the ability and resources to negotiate the level of control they have over not only the
sovereignty of their data, but also the level of oversight on the sanitisation of storage media. The average user
does not have such an ability, without paying a significant fee.

CONCLUSION
Unless there is a serious effort to increase the level the education, the issue of recoverable remnant data will
continue. As the world moves in the direction of a paperless office, the information that will become available
increases exponentially. Many households receive utility bills, bank statements and share dividend statements via
email. The world’s data holdings stood at 4.4 zettabytes in 2013 and is predicted to grow to 44 zettabytes by
2020 (Khoso, 2016). This large quantity of data has the potential to encompass a significant portion of personal
and confidential data that could also end up on the second hand market. This paper has highlighted areas that
require further research, these being; an in-depth study of how search engines interpret the needs of the user and
then display relevant links; and the quality of literature and supporting information that is supplied to end-users
in the public domain.
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